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#### The aff’s framing of energy policy as a question of impacts to avoid obscures the affirmative question of what kind of society we want to build—they cement the hegemony of technological thought and undermine democratic decision making

**WINNER 1989** (Prof of Poli Sci at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, The Whale and the Reactor)

In recent times the idea of recognizing limits upon the growth of certain technologies has experienced something of a revival. Many people are prepared to entertain the notion of limiting a given technology if:

1. Its application threatens public health or safety

2. Its use threatens to exhaust some vital resource

3. It degrades the quality of the environment (air, land, and

water)

4. It threatens natural species and wilderness areas that ought

to be preserved\

5. Its application causes social stresses and strains of an exaggerated

kind.

Along with ongoing discussions about ways to sustain economic growth, national competitiveness, and prosperity, these are the only matters of technology assessment that the general public, decision makers, and academicians are prepared to take seriously.

While such concerns are valid, they severely restrict the range of moral and political criteria that are permissible in public deliberations about technological change. Several years ago I tried to register my discomfort on this score with some colleagues in computer science and sociology who were doing a study of the then-novel systems ofelectronic funds transfer (EFT). They had concluded that such systems contained the potential for redistributing financial power in the world of banking. Electronic money would make possible a shift ofpower from smaller banks to large national and international financial institutions. Beyond that it appeared such systems posed serious problems about data protection and individual privacy. They asked me to suggest an effective way of presenting the possible dangers of this development to their audience of scholars and policy makers. I recommended that their research try to show that under conditions of heavy, continued exposure, EFT causes cancer in laboratory animals. Surely, that finding would be cause for concern. My ironic suggestion acknowledged what I take to be the central characteristic of socially acceptable criticism of technology in our time. Unless one can demonstrate conclusively that a particular technical practice will generate some physically evident catastrophe cancer, birth defects, destruction of the ozone layer, or some other-one might as well remain silent.

The conversation about technology and society has continued to a point at which an obvious question needs to be addressed: Are there no shared ends that matter to us any longer other than the desire to be affluent while avoiding the risk of cancer? It may be that the answer is no. The prevailing consensus seems to be that people love a life ofhigh consumption, tremble at the thought that it might end, and are displeased about having to clean up the messes that modern technologies sometimes bring. To argue a moral position convincingly these days requires that one speak to (and not depart from) people's love of material well-being, their fascination with efficiency, or their fear of death. The moral sentiments that hold force can be arrayed on a spectrum ranging from Adam Smith to Frederick W. Taylor to Thomas Hobbes. I do not wish to deny the validity of these sentiments, only to point out that they represent an extremely narrow mindset. Concerns about particular technological hazards are sometimes the beginning of a much broader political awareness. But for the most part we continue to disregard a problem that has been brewing since the earliest days of the industrial revolution-whether our society can establish forms and limits for technological change, forms and limits that derive from a positively articulated idea of what society ought to be.

As a way of beginning that project, I would suggest a simple heuristic exercise. Let us suppose that every political philosophy in a given time implies a technology or set of technologies in a particular pattern for its realization. And let us recognize that every technology of significance to us implies a set of political commitments that can be identified if one looks carefully enough. What appear to be merely instrumental choices are better seen as choices about the form of social and political life a society builds, choices about the kinds of people we want to become. Plato's metaphor, especially his reference to the shipwright, is one that an age of high technology ought to ponder carefully: we ought to layout the keels of our vessels with due consideration to what means or manner of life best serves our purpose in our voyage over the sea of time. The vessels that matter now are such things as communications systems, transit systems, energy supply and distribution systems, information networks, household instruments, biomedical technologies, and of course systems of industrial and agricultural production. Just as Plato and Aristotle posed the question, What is the best form of political society? so also an age of high technology ought to ask, What forms of technology are compatible with the kind of society we want to build?

Answers to that question often appear as subliminal themes or concealed agendas in policy discussions that seem to be about productivity, efficiency, and economic growth. A perfect set of examples can be found among the dozens of sophisticated energy studies conducted during the 1970s in response to what was then called "the energy crisis." A careful reader can survey the various reports and interpret the political and social structures their analyses and recommendations imply. 14 Would it be nuclear power administered by a benign priesthood of scientists? Would it be coal and oil brought to you by large, multinational corporations? Would it be synthetic fuels subsidized and administered by the state? Or would it be the soft energy path brought to you by you and your neighbors?

Whatever one's position might be, the prevailing consensus required that all parties base their arguments on a familiar premise: efficiency. Regardless of how a particular energy solution would affect the distribution of wealth and social power, the case for or against it had to be stated as a practical necessity deriving from demonstrable conditions of technical or economic efficiency. As the Ford Foundation's Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group explained: "When analyzing energy, one must first decide whether ordinary rules of economics can be applied." The group decided that, yes, energy should be considered "an economic variable, rather than something requiring special analysis." 15 After that decision had been made, of course, the rest was simply a matter of putting Btus or kilowatt-hours in the numerator and dollars in the denominator and worshipping the resulting ratio as gospel.

Even those who held unorthodox viewpoints in this debate found it necessary to uphold the supreme importance ofthis criterion. Thus, Amory B. Lovins, a leading proponent ofsoft energy paths, wrote of his method: "While not under the illusion that facts are separable from values, I have tried ... to separate my personal preferences from my analytic assumptions and to rely not on modes of discourse that might be viewed as overtly ideological, but rather on classicial arguments of economic and engineering efficiency (which are only tacitly ideological)." 16 To Lovins's credit, he consistently argued that the social consequences of energy choices were, in the last analysis, the most important aspect of energy policy making. In his widely read Soft Energy Paths, Lovins called attention to "centrism, vulnerability, technocracy, repression, alienation" and other grave problems that·afflict conventional energy solutions. Lovins compares "two energy paths that are distinguished by their antithetical social implications." He notes that basing energy decisions on social criteria may appear to involve a "heroic decision," that is, "doing something the more expensive way because it is desirable on other more important grounds than internal cost." But Lovins is careful not to appeal to his readers' sense of courage or altruism. "Surprisingly," he writes, "a heroic deci- sion does not seem to be necessary in this case, because the energy system that seems socially more attractive is also cheaper and easier." 17 But what if the analysis had shown the contrary?

Would Lovins have been prepared to give up the social advantages believed to exist along the soft energy path? Would he have accepted "centrism, vulnerability, technocracy, repression, alienation," and the like? Here Lovins yielded ground that in recent history has again and again been abandoned as lost territory. It raises the question of whether even the best intentioned, best qualified analysts in technological decision making are anything more than mere efficiency worshippers. Much the same strategy often appears in the arguments of those who favor democratic self-management, decentralization, and human-scale technology. As Paul Goodman once noted, "Now, if lecturing at a college, I happen to mention that some function of society which is highly centralized could be much decentralized without loss of efficiency, or perhaps with a gain in efficiency, at once the students want to talk about nothing else." 18 That approach is, indeed, one way of catching people's attention; if you can get away with it, it is certainly a most convincing kind of argument. Because the idea of efficiency attracts a wide consensus, it is sometimes used as a conceptual Trojan horse by those who have more challenging political agendas they hope to smuggle in. But victories won in this way are in other respects great losses. For they affirm in our words and in our methodologies that there are certain human ends that no longer dare be spoken in public. Lingering in that stuffy Trojan horse too long, even soldiers of virtue eventually suffocate.

#### This primacy of technique turns the case and causes extinction

**WILKINSON 1964** (John, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, forward to The Technological Society by Jacques Ellul)

It should not be imagined, however, that the universal concentration camp which Ellus thinks is coming into being in all technical societies without exception will be felt as harsh or restrictive by its inmates. Hitler’s concentration camps of hobnailed boots were symptoms of a deficient political technique. The denizen of the technological state of the future will have everything his heart ever desired, **except**, of course, his **freedom**. Admittedly, modern man, forced by technique to become in reality and without residue the imaginary producer-consumer of the classical economists, shows disconcertingly little regard for his lost freedom; but, according to Ellul, there are ominous signs that human spontaneity, which in the rational and ordered technical society has no expression except madness, is only too capable of outbreaks of irrational **suicidal destructiveness**.

The escape valves of modern literature and art, which technique has contrived, may or may not turn out to be adequate to the harmless release of the pent-up “ecstatic” energies of the human being. Technique, which can in principle only oppose technical and quantitative solutions to technical problems, must, in such a case, seek out other technical safety valves. It could, for example, convince men that they were happy and contented by means of drugs, even though they were visibly suffering from the worst kind of spiritual and material privation. It is obvious that *all such ultimate technical measures* must cause the last meager “idealistic” motifs of the whole technical enterprise to disappear. Ellul does not specifically say so, but it seems that he must hold that the technological society, like everything else, bears within itself the **seeds of its own destruction.**

It must not be imagined that the autonomous technique envisioned by Ellul is a kind of “technological determinism,” to use a phrase of Veblen. It may sometimes seem so, but only because all human institutions, like the motions of all physical bodies, have a certain permanence, or vis inertiae, which makes it highly probably that the near future of statistical aggregations will see them continue more or less in the path of the immediate past. Things could have eventuated in the technological society otherwise than they have.

Technique, to Ellul, is a “blind” force, but one which unfortunately seems to be more perspicacious than the best discernible human intelligences. There *are* other ways out, Ellul maintains, but nobody wants any part of them.

Ellul’s insistence that the technical phenomenon is not a determinism is not weakened by the enumeration (in the second chapter) of five conditions which are said to be “necessary and sufficient” for its outburst in the recent past, since the sufficient conditions for the conditions (for example, the causes of the population explosion) are not ascertainable.

The inertia of the technical phenomenon guarantees not only the continued refinement and production of relatively beneficial articles such as flush toilets and wonder drugs, but also the emergence of those unpredictable secondary effects which are always the result of ecological meddling and which today are of such magnitude and acceleration that they can scarcely be reconciled with even semistable equilibrium conditions of society. Nuclear explosions and population explosions capture the public’s imagination; but I have argued that Ellul’s analysis demands that *all* indices of modern technological culture are exploding, too, and are potentially just as dangerous to the continued well-being of society, if by well-being we understand social equilibrium.

#### The alternative is to reject the 1AC- only this iconoclastic rejection of the ‘technique’ opens up a space for truly reasonable debate

**KOWALSKI AND HALUZA-DE LAY 2011** (Nathan, St. Joseph’s College; Randolph, King’s University College, “Homo Energeticus: An Ellulian Analysis of the Alberta Tar Sands,” Dec 17, http://www.academia.edu/1216875/Homo\_energeticus\_Jacques\_Ellul\_on\_the\_Alberta\_Oilsands)

Kevin Garrison summarizes thus: modern techno-logic is “a continual move toward rationalizing all aspects of human life, placing those aspects within a technical sphere, and destroying all possibilities for thinking or acting outside that sphere” (2010, p. 197). Thus, inBourdieu’s terms, technique is what the entire social system takes for granted as the conditions of practical action (“ doxa ”), the universe of the undiscussed and undisputed (Bourdieu, 1977, p.168).Whenever the technical system seems to be flawed or disagreeable in some manner, the only conceivable option is to view these problems as technical problems that technical progress will eventually solve. 3 Faith in future technology as a salvific force reinforces the prior conviction that technology is sacrosanct and cannot be in any way dispensed with. Our contention is that the Alberta tar sands are presented as untouchable and therefore may only becorrected by further technical remediation. It is in this way that Ellul’s theory of techniqueamounts to the (in)famous claim that technology is autonomous . Ellul’s sociological analyses exhibit a tension between the way the society actually is, the way it wants to be, and the way itwill be if current trajectories are maintained. Our claim is that the Alberta tar sands are sold to Albertan society in terms of inevitability and irresistibility, when this is, in fact, not true.

In the end, the point of Ellul’s analysis is that techno-logic is an idea of our own thatnevertheless controls us. Our contention is that the Alberta tar sands impose demands on societythat are accepted by both Albertan voters and the politicians that reiterate those demands, and thus their development is carried out as if we had no choice in the matter. In the end, however, Ellul is not the pessimist he is made out to be by critics. In spite of places where he decries atechnological tyranny, Ellul’s theological writings develop the hope that he has in the face of his sociology of technology. Put simply, he declares “we must destroy the deified religious character of technique” (Ellul 1981?, p. 89). Borrowing from his Christian background, he advocates the iconoclastic desacralization of the falsely sacrosanct technical phenomenon. But such“[i]conoclasm is possible only to the extent that one is able to give up the religious assurances of one’s culture” (Vanderburg, in Ellul, 2004, p. 129), and only if those religious assurances are notalready built into the architecture and geography of our social environment (cf. Huber 2009, p.474). Our contention is that the Alberta tar sands should be exposed as false gods, and only after such desacralization can truly reasonable debate take place as to how their development might proceed.

### 2

#### Immigration reform will pass—momentum

Sargent 10/30 – Greg Sargent is an opinions writer for the WaPo. He joined the Post in early 2009, after stints at Talking Points Memo, New York Magazine and the New York Observer. (“Immigration reform is definitely undead”, 10/30/2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/10/30/immigration-reform-is-definitely-undead/)

We now have three House Republicans who have signed on to the House Dem comprehensive immigration reform bill, **putting immigration reform officially back in the “undead” category**. GOP Rep. David Valadao of California is officially on board with the bipartisan proposal, according to a statement from the Congressman sent my way: “I have been working with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to find common ground on the issue of immigration reform. Recently, I have focused my efforts on joining with likeminded Republicans in organizing and demonstrating to Republican Leadership broad support within the Party to address immigration reform in the House by the end of the year. “By supporting H.R. 15 I am strengthening my message: Addressing immigration reform in the House cannot wait. I am serious about making real progress and will remain committed to doing whatever it takes to repair our broken immigration system.” Valadao’s move is not wholly unexpected, given that he inhabits a moderate district with a lot of Latinos. But his insistence that addressing immigration reform “cannot wait” is helpful. It seems like an implicit message to the GOP leadership: We must act this year, and on this bill, if necessary. This comes after GOP Reps. leana Ros-Lehtinen and Jeff Denham Jeff Denham did the same. Denham has said he expects “more” Republicans to ultimately sign on, and has also said that the House GOP leadership told him there will be a vote on something immigration-related by the end of the year. It’s unclear whether there will actually be a House vote on anything involving immigration before the year runs out, and it seems very unlikely that there will be a vote on the House Dem measure, which is essentially the Senate comprehensive immigration reform bill, without the Corker-Hoeven border security amendment that House Dems dislike, and instead with another border security amendment House Dems like swapped in. However, the movement among Republicans towards the Dem bill — even if it is only a trickle for now — is interesting, as a reminder that immigration reform can happen if House GOP leaders actually want it to.

#### The plan sparks backlash over the process of ratification, and requires Presidential involvement

**Taylor, 2013** (Phi,l E&E Reporter, 1/9/13, “E&E: U.S.-Mexico transboundary agreement mired in Congress,” http://www.bromwichgroup.com/2013/01/ee-offshore-drilling-u-s-mexico-transboundary-agreement-mired-in-congress/)

It is unclear who in the Senate objected to the agreement’s passage, but sources say it was likely out of concern for the process by which it was being passed rather than the substance of the agreement. That may stem in part from lingering uncertainty over whether the agreement is a treaty, which would require a two-thirds majority for Senate ratification, or an executive agreement, which would require implementing legislation to be passed by a majority in both chambers. Regardless, its failure was a surprise to staff on the ENR Committee who had crafted a news release in preparation for its passage but had to delete it after the agreement was blocked. According to the report by Foreign Relations Republicans, the Obama administration has yet to say whether the agreement is a treaty or an executive agreement but appears to prefer the latter. Mexico’s Senate ratified the agreement, suggesting it was interpreted as a treaty. If it is a treaty, a formal communication would need to be sent from the president to the Foreign Relations Committee, which would trigger hearings on the matter and allow Congress to interpret any ambiguous language in the agreement. That is important, because several provisions in the treaty “invite scrutiny and clarification,” according to the committee report. “The treaty doesn’t have every detail worked out,” said Neil Brown, a former adviser to Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) who was ranking member of the committee until his retirement earlier this month. For example, one section of the agreement calls for “common standards,” but it is unclear whether that requires companies to adopt U.S. safety and environmental standards or Mexico’s, which are considered less developed. Another area of the agreement creates a dispute resolution process without saying whether the arbitration is binding, the report said. The agreement would allow joint inspections by Interior’s BSEE and the Mexican government to ensure compliance with applicable laws. Some on the Foreign Relations Committee said they were miffed that the administration did not consult with them before pushing the agreement through in the lame duck.

#### Political capital is key to get it through the House

Munro 10-24

[Neil. Politics for the Daily Caller. 10/24/13 <http://dailycaller.com/2013/10/24/obama-to-urge-immigration-increase-in-white-house-speech/#ixzz2ifJsBq9g> //GBS-JV]

Obama’s high-profile speech also reverses his long-standing effort to keep a low profile in the debate. The strategy was intended to help immigration-friendly Republicans, including Sen. Marco Rubio, Sen. Lindsey Graham and Rep. Paul Ryan, woo GOP legislators for the amnesty and doubled inflow. The plan helped the Democrats get a bill through the Senate in June. Obama is expected to couch his East Room call for greater immigration in poll-tested and vague language that masks the unpopular aspects of the proposed rewrite. On Oct. 17, for example, Obama said the bill “would make the biggest commitment to border security in our history; would modernize our legal immigration system; make sure everyone plays by the same rules, makes sure that folks who came here illegally have to pay a fine, pay back taxes, meet their responsibilities.” ¶ In practice, the Senate bill would double immigration via various programs, and provide a staged amnesty to 11 million illegal immigrants. Overall, it would ensure the arrival of 33 million immigrants over 10 years, and double the resident pool of low-wage, university trained guest-workers to roughly 2 million.

#### The skilled workers from immigration reform solve climate change

Herman and Smith, 10

(Richard T. Herman is the founder of Richard T. Herman & Associates, an immigration and business law firm in Cleveland, Ohio which serves a global clientele in over 10 languages. He is the co-founder of a chapter of TiE, a global network of entrepreneurs started in 1992 in Silicon Valley. He has appeared on National Public Radio, FOX News, and various affiliates of NBC, CBS, and ABC. He has also been quoted in such publications as USA Today,InformationWeek, PCWorld, ComputerWorld, CIO, Site Selection and National Lawyers Weekly, Robert L. Smith is a veteran journalist who covers international cultures and immigration issues for the Cleveland Plain Dealer, Ohio’s largest newspaper. Bob grew up in Cleveland, where he lives with his wife, Cleveland Orchestra violinist Chul-In Park, and their two children, Jae, 5, and Sun-Hee, 3. He has written extensively about immigration issues and has interviewed people at all points of the immigrant experience, from undocumented field workers to hugely successful entrepreneurs, Parts of this paper were excerpted from the book “[Immigrant Inc.: Why Immigrant Entrepreneurs are Driving the New Economy (and how they will save the American worker)](http://www.immigrantinc.com/)” (John Wiley & Sons, 2009) by Richard T. Herman & Robert L. Smith.  Available wherever books are sold, “Why Immigrants Can Drive the Green Economy,” Immigation Policy Center, <http://immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/why-immigrants-can-drive-green-economy>)

Raymond Spencer, an Australian-born entrepreneur based in Chicago, has a window on the future—and a gusto for investing after founding a high-technology consulting company that sold for more than $1 billion in 2006. “I have investments in maybe 10 start-ups, all of which fall within a broad umbrella of a ‘green’ theme,” he said. “And it’s interesting, the vast majority are either led by immigrants or have key technical people who are immigrants.” It should come as no surprise that immigrants will help drive the green revolution. America’s young scientists and engineers, especially the ones drawn to emerging industries like alternative energy, tend to speak with an accent. The 2000 Census found that immigrants, while accounting for 12 percent of the population, made up nearly half of the all scientists and engineers with doctorate degrees. Their importance will only grow. Nearly 70 percent of the men and women who entered the fields of science and engineering from 1995 to 2006 were immigrants. Yet, the connection between immigration and the development and commercialization of alternative energy technology is rarely discussed. Policymakers envision millions of new jobs as the nation pursues renewable energy sources, like wind and solar power, and builds a smart grid to tap it. But Dan Arvizu, the leading expert on solar power and the director of the National Renewable Energy Laboratory of the U.S. Department of Energy in Golden, Colorado, warns that much of the clean-technology talent lies overseas, in nations that began pursuing alternative energy sources decades ago. Expanding our own clean-tech industry will require working closely with foreign nations and foreign-born scientists, he said. Immigration restrictions are making collaboration difficult. His lab’s efforts to work with a Chinese energy lab, for example, were stalled due to U.S. immigration barriers. “We can’t get researchers over here,” Arvizu, the son of a once-undocumented immigrant from Mexico, said in an interview in March 2009, his voice tinged with dismay. “It makes no sense to me. We need a much more enlightened approach.” Dr. Zhao Gang, the Vice Director of the Renewable Energy and New Energy International Cooperation Planning Office of the Ministry of Science and Technology in China, says that America needs that enlightenment fast. “The Chinese government continues to impress upon the Obama administration that immigration restrictions are creating major impediments to U.S.-China collaboration on clean energy development,” he said during a recent speech in Cleveland. So what’s the problem? Some of it can be attributed to national security restrictions that impede international collaboration on clean energy. But Arvizu places greater weight on immigration barriers, suggesting that national secrecy is less important in the fast-paced world of green-tech development. “We are innovating so fast here, what we do today is often outdated tomorrow. Finding solutions to alternative energy is a complex, global problem that requires global teamwork,” he said. We need an immigration system that prioritizes the attraction and retention of scarce, high-end talent needed to invent and commercialize alternative energy technology and other emerging technologies. One idea we floated by Arvizu was a new immigrant “Energy Scientist Visa,” providing fast-track green cards for Ph.D.s with the most promising energy research, as reviewed by a panel of top U.S. scientists. Arvizu enthusiastically responded, “Wow, that’s a brilliant idea.” As the recent submission of the Startup Visa Act bill suggests, there’s really no shortage of good ideas of leveraging immigration to jumpstart the economy. The challenge is getting the American people to understand that high-skill immigration creates jobs, that the current system is broken, and that action is required now. Suffering an Antiquated System [▲](http://immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/why-immigrants-can-drive-green-economy#up) While unlimited H1-B visas are available to foreign workers at U.S. government and university research labs, the antiquated green-card system creates a disincentive for immigrant researchers who seek a more permanent stay and status in the U.S. Anyone coming to America from a foreign land experiences the U.S. immigration system. They seldom forget the experience. This vast bureaucracy, with tentacles reaching into myriad federal agencies, wields enormous power over the lives of people trying to follow its directives. Federal immigration authorities decide if a persecuted family can escape Congo, if a prospective college student from Germany will start the school year on time in Cleveland, or if a Honduran family separated for years will be reunited in Miami. U.S. immigration law dictates who can enter America and how long they can stay. Congress can enact new immigration policies as it deems fit—and it did so in 1986 and in 1990. But the foundation of the system remains the Federal Immigration and Nationality Acts of 1965 and 1952. The 1965 act diversified America by opening immigration to new parts of the world, but it also levied restrictions that soon become dated and counterproductive. In a manufacturing era, the act made family reunification an overarching goal, while paying relatively little attention to the migration of highly skilled workers. In fact, it imposed rigid nationality quotas on skilled immigrants. The result, critics say, is a dinosaur of a system ill-equipped to deal with the demands of a fast-changing, global economy. [CONTINUED] “Our immigration laws discriminate pretty heavily against highly talented scientists and engineers who want to come to this country and be part of our technological establishment,” Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke told a Congressional panel in May 2009. Of particular concern to employers and economists are two sets of quotas: one that limits the number of visas available to skilled workers, and another that limits the visas available to a nationality. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) issues about 1 million green cards per year. Also known as immigrant visas, green cards bestow permanent residency, or the right to live and work permanently in America. A green card puts one on the path to citizenship. In a typical year, the vast majority of green cards go to people sponsored by a family member already here. There is no limit to the numbers of green cards that can be issued to the spouses, parents, and unmarried children of naturalized U.S. citizens. America accepts far fewer people whose main reason for coming is to practice a profession, to pursue science, or to start a company—even if that person possesses extraordinary ability. The government is restricted by law to issuing 140,000 employment or skill-based green cards each year to applicants and their immediate family members. That’s about 15 percent of the immigrant visa pool. A chunk of green cards are set aside for religious workers and wealthy investors, so the United States actually offers 120,000 employment-based green cards each year. Within the employment visa categories, known as EB visas, are several subcategories that acknowledge skill levels. For example, 40,000 visas are designated for persons of extraordinary ability—outstanding professors, researchers, and multinational executives. Another 40,000 visas are designated for professionals with advanced academic degrees whose work will serve U.S. national interests. And another 10,000 visas are available for wealthy people who commit to investing in a U.S. enterprise and creating jobs. So, out of 1 million green cards issued in an average year, 90,000, or about 9 percent, are reserved for persons with advanced degrees, exceptional skills, or capital to create jobs. Put another way, about 9 percent of immigrant visas are reserved for high-skill immigrants—the people driving the New Economy. It’s a scant amount in the context of a U.S. labor force of 154 million people. Should those exceptional immigrants hail from a nation whose workers are in high demand—for example, India and China—they face delays imposed by a nationality quota system. The 1965 immigration law sets per-country limits on employment visas. People from any one nation cannot use more than 7 percent of the visas available that year. This means that workers from large sending countries are forced to wait, sometimes more than 8 years, because their visa allotment has been “oversubscribed” by their fellow citizens. The 7 percent quota applies equally to every nation on Earth, regardless of its size or the potential number of immigrants it sends to America. For example, Malawi, which has a population of 10.5 million people, is allocated the same amount of employment visas as India, which has a population of over 1 billion. In any given year, only 5,600 green cards are reserved for Indians with advanced academic degrees or extraordinary ability, the same number available to nationals of Malawi. Congress has sought to circumvent the quotas and respond to industry demands—especially in high technology—with guest worker visas like the H1-B, a source of some controversy. The H-1B is a temporary visa for a professional offered a job by a U.S. company that agrees to pay the prevailing market wage. Only 65,000 regular H-1B visas are available each year, a quota set in the early 1990s and temporarily increased to 195,000 from 2001 to 2003. Many employers say the cap is set too low to meet their needs, especially as they seek to staff engineering and software positions. Some lawmakers would like to help them with a higher quota. These skilled immigrants often come to America as students, then go to work in growing industries. A 2008 study by the National Foundation for American Policy found that for each worker hired on an H-1B visa, at least five new jobs were created. But many labor groups argue that the cap is already set too high. Only a bachelor’s degree is required to qualify for this visa, and critics charge the H-1B visas crowd skilled Americans out of the workplace, suppress wages, and make it easier for employers to outsource jobs to low-cost countries like India. Even immigrant advocates criticize the H-1B as a second-class visa that produces an anxious life. Tied to their employers, the guest workers cannot switch jobs unless their new employer is willing to sponsor their visa, and their spouses are not allowed to work. The three-year visa can be renewed once. But after six years, the visa holder must go home unless he or she is able to get a green-card sponsor. The national-origin quotas, coupled with a limit of 90,000 immigrant visas reserved for highly skilled professionals or investors, helps to explain why so many talented immigrants—many of them H-1B visa holders—wait in vain for permission to live and work in America. Many are now leaving the U.S., or simply not coming to study or work on an H1B.

#### Climate change causes extinction – action *now* is key

Roberts 13 – citing the World Bank Review’s compilation of climate studies - 4 degree projected warming, can’t adapt - heat wave related deaths, forest fires, crop production, water wars, ocean acidity, sea level rise, climate migrants, biodiversity loss. ("If you aren’t alarmed about climate, you aren’t paying attention", January 10, 2013, [http://grist.org/climate-energy/climate-alarmism-the-idea-is-surreal](http://grist.org/climate-energy/climate-alarmism-the-idea-is-surreal/~~))

We know we’ve raised global average temperatures around 0.8 degrees C so far. We know that 2 degrees C is where most scientists predict catastrophic and irreversible impacts. And we know that we are currently on a trajectory that will push temperatures up 4 degrees or more by the end of the century. What would 4 degrees look like? A recent [World Bank review of the science](http://climatechange.worldbank.org/) reminds us. First, it’ll get hot: Projections for a 4°C world show a dramatic increase in the intensity and frequency of high-temperature extremes. Recent extreme heat waves such as in Russia in 2010 are likely to become the new normal summer in a 4°C world. Tropical South America, central Africa, and all tropical islands in the Pacific are likely to regularly experience heat waves of unprecedented magnitude and duration. In this new high-temperature climate regime, the coolest months are likely to be substantially warmer than the warmest months at the end of the 20th century. In regions such as the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Middle East, and the Tibetan plateau, almost all summer months are likely to be warmer than the most extreme heat waves presently experienced. For example, the warmest July in the Mediterranean region could be 9°C warmer than today’s warmest July. Extreme heat waves in recent years have had severe impacts, causing heat-related deaths, forest fires, and harvest losses. The impacts of the extreme heat waves projected for a 4°C world have not been evaluated, but they could be expected to vastly exceed the consequences experienced to date and potentially **exceed the adaptive capacities of many societies and natural systems**. [my emphasis] Warming to 4 degrees would also lead to “an increase of about 150 percent in acidity of the ocean,” leading to levels of acidity “unparalleled in Earth’s history.” That’s bad news for, say, coral reefs: The combination of thermally induced bleaching events, ocean acidification, and sea-level rise threatens large fractions of coral reefs even at 1.5°C global warming. The regional extinction of entire coral reef ecosystems, which could occur well before 4°C is reached, would have profound consequences for their dependent species and for the people who depend on them for food, income, tourism, and shoreline protection. It will also “likely lead to a sea-level rise of 0.5 to 1 meter, and possibly more, by 2100, with several meters more to be realized in the coming centuries.” That rise won’t be spread evenly, even within regions and countries — regions close to the equator will see even higher seas. There are also indications that it would “significantly exacerbate existing water scarcity in many regions, particularly northern and eastern Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, while additional countries in Africa would be newly confronted with water scarcity on a national scale due to population growth.” Also, more extreme weather events: Ecosystems will be affected by more frequent extreme weather events, such as forest loss due to droughts and wildfire exacerbated by land use and agricultural expansion. In Amazonia, forest fires could as much as double by 2050 with warming of approximately 1.5°C to 2°C above preindustrial levels. Changes would be expected to be even more severe in a 4°C world. Also loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services: In a 4°C world, climate change seems likely to become the dominant driver of ecosystem shifts, surpassing habitat destruction as the greatest threat to biodiversity. Recent research suggests that large-scale loss of biodiversity is likely to occur in a 4°C world, with climate change and high CO2 concentration driving a transition of the Earth’s ecosystems into a state unknown in human experience. Ecosystem damage would be expected to dramatically reduce the provision of ecosystem services on which society depends (for example, fisheries and protection of coastline afforded by coral reefs and mangroves.) New research also indicates a “rapidly rising risk of crop yield reductions as the world warms.” So food will be tough. All this will add up to “large-scale displacement of populations and have adverse consequences for human security and economic and trade systems.” Given the uncertainties and long-tail risks involved, “there is no certainty that adaptation to a 4°C world is possible.” There’s a small but non-trivial chance of advanced civilization breaking down entirely. Now ponder the fact that some scenarios show us going up to 6degrees by the end of the century, a level of devastation we have not studied and barely know how to conceive. Ponder the fact that somewhere along the line, though we don’t know exactly where, enough self-reinforcing feedback loops will be running to make climate change unstoppable and irreversible for centuries to come. That would mean handing our grandchildren and their grandchildren not only a **burned, chaotic, denuded world**, but a world that is inexorably more inhospitable with every passing decade.

### 3

#### Oil prices are rising – Libya output will decline, US manufacturing increasing, and futures are up

Investing 10-28 [Investing.com, commodity news website, “Crude prices rise on Libya export data, U.S. production report,” 10/28/2013, [http://www.investing.com/news/commodities-news/crude-prices-rise-on-libya-export-data,-u.s.-production-report-254394](http://www.investing.com/news/commodities-news/crude-prices-rise-on-libya-export-data%2C-u.s.-production-report-254394)] STRYKER

Investing.com - Oil prices rose on Monday on reports of falling exports out of Libya coupled with a bullish U.S. report revealing increasing output at the country's factories, mines and utilities.¶ On the New York Mercantile Exchange, light sweet crude futures for delivery in December traded at USD98.48 a barrel during U.S. trading, up 0.64%.¶ The commodity hit a session low of USD97.39 and a high of USD98.80. The December contract settled up 0.76% at USD97.85 a barrel on Friday.¶ Crude prices shot up on Reuters reports that exports from Libya dropped to approximately 250,000 barrels per day, down from an overall capacity of 1.25 million barrels per day, due to labor protests disrupting operations at major oilfields and ports.¶ Separately, the commodity saw support on surprisingly strong industrial output data in the U.S., which sparked fresh expectations for a more robust U.S. recovery that will hike demand for fuel and energy going forward.¶ The Federal Reserve reported on Monday that U.S. industrial production rose by a 0.6% last month, above expectations for a 0.4% rise and the fastest increase in seven months.¶ Meanwhile on the ICE Futures Exchange, Brent oil futures for November delivery were up 1.89% at USD108.96 a barrel, up USD10.48 from its U.S. counterpart.

#### TBA would increase Mexico oil production from the Gulf, decreasing price on global markets

**Goldwyn 2013** [4/11; David L. Goldwyn, President, Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC; “The Impact of the Tight Oil and Gas Boom on Latin America and the Caribbean: Opportunities for Cooperation” http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20130411/100622/HHRG-113-FA07-Wstate-GoldwynD-20130411.pdf]

 Mexico has been a long time reliable supplier, but its oil production has been falling steadily   since 2004. Due to constitutional constraints, foreign involvement in upstream development and   ownership of resources has been strictly limited. In 2008 minor reforms were undertaken that   loosened those restrictions, granting PEMEX greater autonomy and making it possible for some   private participation in exploration and production through incentive-based contracts with foreign   oil companies, but the impact was minimal and production has continued to fall. In 2011,   PEMEX announced the first production licensing round in Mexico in over 70 years, with 20   blocks noted for international bidders.25 For a number of years, analysts have noted that unless   the Mexican government dramatically increases the amount of PEMEX earnings it can keep for   capital investment (in 2004 PEMEX paid the government 60% of its revenues), the company   would have significant difficulties in maintaining production, not to mention expanding into more   technically complex and diverse resources. Mexico has enormous oil potential on its side of the   Gulf of Mexico and a change in policy could both change global oil markets and create a   formidable source of wealth for development of the country itself.  Change appears to be forthcoming for Mexico. In 2012 Mexico ratified the US-Mexico Transboundary Agreement that would permit foreign investment in the Mexican Gulf of Mexico if a   trans-boundary reservoir were to be found, and if companies on both sides of the reservoir wished   to cooperate. This is an effort I helped launch during my tenure at the Department of State. The   US needs to adopt implementing legislation allowing the U.S Department of Interior to   implement the agreement, and the US needs to notify the Congress, although it does not require   Senate ratification in my view. More recently, the new government of President Enrique Pena   Nieto has announced plans to undertake major reforms of the energy sector and conduct some   experimentation with Mexico’s shale oil and gas reserves. Some analysts view these reforms with  skepticism, noting that the constitutional nature of the restrictions on the energy sector may   require that any reforms are backed by a constitutional amendment, but the initiative appears to   be sincere. If the reforms are unsuccessful, the EIA estimates that Mexico, currently one of the   largest sources of oil exports to the U.S., could see its production sink as low as 1.4 mbd by 2025,   compared to 2.96 mbd in 2011. Any incremental step that Mexico can take would be helpful to   the global oil market. I am optimistic that Mexico will make significant reforms, including   constitution changes.

#### That crushes the Russian economy and undermines support for the regime

**KRAMER 12** – New York Times writer and editor (ANDREW E. “Higher Oil Prices to Pay for Campaign Promises” New York Times March 16, 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/business/global/vladimir-putins-big-promises-need-fueling-by-high-oil-prices.html?\_r=2?pagewanted=print Putin Needs)

MOSCOW — In American presidential politics, high oil prices are a problem. For Vladimir V. Putin’s new presidential term in Russia, they will be a necessity — crucial to fulfilling his campaign promises to lift government spending by billions of dollars a year. But doing that without busting the Kremlin’s budget would require oil to reach and sustain a price it has never yet achieved — $150 a barrel, according to one estimate by Citigroup. No wonder economists who specialize in Russia are skeptical. (On Friday, Russia’s Ural Blend export-grade oil was trading at $120 on the global spot market.) “It’s very hard to overestimate how vulnerable the Russian economy is to external pressures” from the oil price, Sergei Guriev, the rector of the New Economic School in Moscow, said in a telephone interview. “That vulnerability is huge, which is why Russia must be very vigilant. The spending is a risk.” The promised spending is also ambitious. Mr. Putin has laid out a program of raising wages for doctors and teachers, padding retirement checks for everyone and refurbishing Russia’s military arsenal. The oil-lubricated offerings would even include a population premium: expanding the popular “baby bonus” payments the Russian government provides to mothers, to include a third child. The payment, of up to $8,300 for housing or baby-related expenses, now comes as an incentive only with each of the first two children. The additional cost of the expanded baby benefits alone will total $4.6 billion a year, according to an estimate by the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. Most of Mr. Putin’s spending promises came at least partly in response to the street demonstrations by young and middle-class protesters in Moscow and other big cities challenging his authority in the weeks leading up to the March 4 election. His apparent aim was to shore up support from the rest of Russia: poorer and rural parts of the country, and from state workers and the elderly. The repercussions of his campaign promises, and an earlier commitment on military spending, could be felt for years to come, giving price swings in oil a bigger role than ever on the Russian economy. Taxes on oil and natural gas sales provide half of Russia’s government revenue. Each increase in the Russian budget equivalent to 1 percent of the gross domestic product requires a rise in the price of oil of about $10 a barrel on global markets — which is how Citigroup arrived at the $150-a-barrel figure for meeting the new obligations Mr. Putin has taken on. Analysts worry that, even if the government can fulfill its promises, too little will remain for a sovereign wealth fund that is intended as a shock absorber for the Russian economy and the ruble exchange rate during an oil price slump. Russia needed to use that buffer as recently as 2008, during the financial crisis. “The concern is simple,” Kingsmill Bond, the chief strategist at Citigroup in Russia, said in a telephone interview. “If the oil price that Russia requires to balance its budget is higher, the systemic risks that the market faces are also higher.” The bank estimated that Mr. Putin’s promises of higher wages and pensions, not counting the military outlays, add up to additional spending equal to 1.5 percent of Russia’s gross domestic product. That comes on top of an earlier pledge to spend an additional 3 percent of gross domestic product a year re-arming the military. In all, the new commitments would add up to about $98 billion a year, Citigroup estimates. The spillover from the Arab Spring and the specter of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear development plants are propping up oil prices now. But over the long term, economic stagnation in Europe could help bring them down. Even before the election, Russia’s government spending was up, helping reinforce Mr. Putin’s message that he was the best candidate to deliver prosperity and stability. In January, the Russian military ministry, for example, doubled salaries in the nation’s million-person army. It was ostensibly a long-planned move. But coming just two months before the presidential vote, the political message was clear. Also smoothing the path for Mr. Putin’s victory was a national cap on utility rates that helped keep inflation at the lowest level in Russia’s post-Soviet history for January and February, at a 3.7 percent annual pace. “Putin made large spending commitments,” the Fitch rating agency said in a statement released the day after the election. “The current high price of oil cushions Russia’s public finances,” Fitch said. “But in the absence of fiscal tightening that significantly cuts the non-oil and gas fiscal deficit, a severe and sustained drop in the oil price would have a damaging impact on the Russian economy and public finances and would likely lead to a downgrade” of the nation’s credit rating. As Mr. Putin’s spending promises started to be introduced in January, Fitch altered Russia’s outlook to stable, from positive. Mr. Putin has defended the proposed spending as necessary and just, given the hardship of teachers and other public sector workers in the post-Soviet years. “A doctor, a teacher, a professor, these people should make enough money where they work so they don’t have to look for a side job,” Mr. Putin wrote in a manifesto published during the campaign. But in fact, the government will offset a portion of the pay raises, perhaps as much as one-third of their cost, by laying off some public sector workers and trimming some other public spending. That was the word from Lev I. Yakobson, the deputy rector of the Higher School of Economics, who helped draft the policy. That part of the plan, though, was never part of Mr. Putin’s stump speech.

#### Nuclear war

**FILGER 2009** (Sheldon, author and blogger for the Huffington Post, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction” http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356)

In Russia historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation’s history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia’s economic crisis will endanger the nation’s political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama’s national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation’s nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

### PEMEX

**Heg causes war and prolif-recalcitrant power balancing takes out the benefits of heg**

**Monteiro 11** \*Nuno P. Monteiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University [<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064>, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful”]

A unipole carrying out a defensive-dominance strategy will seek to preserve all three aspects of the status quo: maintaining the territorial boundaries and international political alignments of all other states, as well as freezing the global distribution of power. 60 This strategy can lead to conflict in two ways, both of which stem from uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions. First, not knowing the extent of the unipole’s determination to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance may spur some minor powers to develop their capabilities. Second, uncertainty about the degree to which the unipole will oppose small changes to the status quo may lead some minor powers to attempt them. In both cases, the opposition of the unipole to these actions is likely to lead to war. In this section, I lay out these two pathways to conflict and then illustrate them with historical examples. To be sure, states can never be certain of other states’ intentions. 61 There are a couple of reasons, however, why this uncertainty increases in unipolarity, even when the unipole appears to be determined to maintain the status quo. First, other states cannot be certain that the unipole will always pursue nonrevisionist goals. This is particularly problematic because unipolarity minimizes the structural constraints on the unipole’s grand strategy. As Waltz writes, “Even if a dominant power behaves with moderation, restraint, and forbearance, weaker states will worry about its future behavior. . . . The absence of se rious threats to American security gives the United States wide latitude in making foreign policy choices.” 62 Second, unipolarity takes away the principal tool through which minor powers in bipolar and multipolar systems deal with uncertainty about great power intentions—alliances with other great powers. Whereas in these other systems minor powers can, in principle, attenuate the effects of uncertainty about great power intentions through external balancing, in a unipolar world no great power sponsor is present by definition. In effect, the systemic imbalance of power magnifies uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions. 63 Faced with this uncertainty, other states have two options. First, they can accommodate the unipole and minimize the chances of conºict but at the price of their external autonomy. 64 Accommodation is less risky for major powers because they can guarantee their own survival, and they stand to beneªt greatly from being part of the unipolar system. 65 Major powers are therefore unlikely to attempt to revise the status quo. Minor powers are also likely to accommodate the unipole, in an attempt to avoid entering a confrontation with a preponderant power. Thus, most states will accommodate the unipole because, as Wohlforth points out, the power differential rests in its favor. 66 Accommodation, however, entails greater risks for minor powers because their survival is not assured if the unipole should turn against them. Thus some of them are likely to implement a second strategic option—resisting the unipole. The structure of the international system does not entirely determine whether or not a minor power accommodates the unipole. Still, structure conditions the likelihood of accommodation in two ways. To begin, a necessary part of a strategy of dominance is the creation of alliances or informal security commitments with regional powers. Such regional powers, however, are likely to have experienced conºict with, or a grievance toward, at least some of its neighboring minor powers. The latter are more likely to adopt a recalcitrant posture. Additionally, by narrowing their opportunities for regional integration and security maximization, the unipole’s interference with the regional balance of power is likely to lower the value of the status quo for these minor powers. 67 As the literature on the “value of peace” shows, countries that attribute a low value to the status quo are more risk acceptant. This argument helps explain, for example, Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 and Syria’s and Egypt’s decision to attack Israel in 1973. 68 In both cases, aggressor states knew that their capabilities were significantly weaker than those of their targets. They were nonetheless willing to run the risk of launching attacks because they found the prewar status quo unacceptable. 69 Thus, for these states, the costs of balancing were lower relative to those of bandwagoning. In an international system with more than one great power, recalcitrant minor powers would, in principle, be able to balance externally by finding a great power sponsor. 70 In unipolarity, however, no such sponsors exist. 71 Only major powers are available, but because their survival is already guaranteed, they are likely to accommodate the unipole. And even if some do not, they are unlikely to meet a recalcitrant minor power’s security needs given that they possess only limited power-projection capabilities. 72 As such, recalcitrant minor powers must defend themselves, which puts them in a position of extreme selfhelp. There are four characteristics common to states in this position: (1) anarchy, (2) uncertainty about other states’ intentions, (3) insufªcient capabilities to deter a great power, and (4) no potential great power sponsor with whom to form a balancing coalition. The ªrst two characteristics are common to all states in all types of polarity. The third is part of the rough-and-tumble of minor powers in any system. The fourth, however, is unique to recalcitrant minor powers in unipolarity. This dire situation places recalcitrant minor powers at risk for as long as they lack the capability to defend themselves. They depend on the goodwill of the unipole and must worry that the unipole will shift to a strategy of offensive dominance or disengagement. Recalcitrant minor powers will therefore attempt to bolster their capabilities through internal balancing. To deter an eventual attack by the unipole and bolster their chances of survival in the event deterrence fails, recalcitrant minor powers will attempt to reinforce their conventional defenses, develop the most effective asymmetric strategies possible, and, most likely in the nuclear age, try to acquire the ultimate deterrent—survivable nuclear weapons. 73 In so doing, they seek to become major powers. Defensive dominance, however, also gives the unipole reason to oppose any such revisions to the status quo. First, such revisions decrease the benefits of systemic leadership and limit the unipole’s ability to convert its relative power advantage into favorable outcomes. In the case of nuclear weapons, this limitation is all but irreversible, virtually guaranteeing the recalcitrant regime immunity against any attempt to coerce or overthrow it. Second, proliferation has the potential to produce regional instability, raising the risk of arms races. These would force the unipole to increase defense spending or accept a narrower overall relative power advantage. Third, proliferation would lead to the emergence of a recalcitrant major power that could become the harbinger of an unwanted large-scale balancing attempt. The unipole is therefore likely to demand that recalcitrant minor powers not revise the status quo. The latter, however, will want to resist such demands because of the threat they pose to those states’ security. 74 Whereas fighting over such demands would probably lead to defeat, conceding to them peacefully would bring the undesired outcome with certainty. A preventive war is therefore likely to ensue. In the second causal path to war, recalcitrant minor powers test the limits of the status quo by making small revisions—be they territorial conquests, altered international alignments, or an increase in relative power—evocative of Thomas Schelling’s famous “salami tactics.” 75 The unipole may not, however, accept these revisions, and instead demand their reversal. For a variety of reasons, including incomplete information, commitment problems, and the need for the minor power to establish a reputation for toughness, such demands may not be heeded. As a result, war between the unipole and recalcitrant minor powers emerges as a distinct possibility. 76 Regardless of the causal path, a war between the unipole and a recalcitrant minor power creates a precedent for other recalcitrant minor powers to boost their own capabilities. Depending on the unipole’s overall capabilities—that is, whether it can launch a second simultaneous conºict—it may also induce other recalcitrant minor powers to accelerate their balancing process. Thus, a war against a recalcitrant minor power presents other such states with greater incentives for, and (under certain conditions) higher prospects of, assuring their survival by acquiring the necessary capabilities, including nuclear weapons. At the same time, and depending on the magnitude of the unipole’s power preponderance, a war against a recalcitrant minor power creates an opportunity for wars among major and minor powers—including major power wars. To the extent that the unipole’s power preponderance is limited by its engagement in the ªrst war, **its ability to manage confrontations** between other states elsewhere is curtailed, increasing the chances that these will erupt into military conflicts. Therefore, even when the unipole is engaged, war remains a possibility. Between the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States generally implemented a strategy of defensive dominance. During this period, the dynamics described in this section can be seen at work in the cases of the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo War, as well as in the Kargil War between India and Pakistan, and in North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear programs. On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein ordered his forces to invade Kuwait, convinced the United States would not oppose this revision of the status quo. During the months that followed, the United States assembled an international coalition determined to restore Kuwaiti independence, and it obtained UN authorization to use force if Iraq did not withdraw its occupation forces by January 15, 1991. Two days after this deadline, the U.S.-led coalition began military action against Iraqi forces, expelling them from Kuwait in six weeks. 77 Two points deserve mention. First, the Gulf War was triggered by Iraq’s miscalculation regarding whether the United States would accept Iraqi annexation of Kuwait. At the outset of the unipolar era, great uncertainty surrounded the limits of what actions U.S. decisionmakers would find permissible. 78 Iraq miscalculated the degree of U.S. ºexibility, and war ensued. Second, the war was made possible by unipolarity, which placed Iraq in a situation of extreme selfhelp. Indeed, lack of a great power sponsor—at the time, the Soviet Union was in strategic retrenchment—was duly noted in Baghdad. Immediately after the war, Saddam’s foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, lamented, “We don’t have a patron anymore. . . . If we still had the Soviets as our patron, none of this would have happened.” 79 Similarly, in 1999, Serbian leaders miscalculated U.S. tolerance to ethnic violence in Kosovo, a secessionist province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In March 1999, reacting to increasing brutality in the province, the international community convened a conference, which produced the Rambouillet accords. This agreement called for the restoration of Kosovo’s autonomy and the deployment of NATO peacekeeping forces, both unacceptable to Serbian authorities, who refused to submit to it. 80 In response, NATO launched a bombing campaign in Yugoslavia. In early June, after nine weeks of bombing, NATO offered the Serbian leadership a compromise, which it accepted, ending the war. 81 Once the war had started and it became clear that Serbia had overreached, Belgrade relied on the support of its ancestral major power ally, Russia. Serbian strategy during the war thus aimed in part at buying time for Russia to increase pressure on NATO to cease hostilities. Contrary to Belgrade’s expectations, however, Russian support for Serbian aims eroded as the war continued. On May 6, Russia agreed with the Group of Seven nations on a plan that included the deployment of UN peacekeepers and a guarantee of Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity. By mid-May, faced with Serbia’s obduracy, Moscow began to press its ally to accept the offer. Thus, not only did Russian support fail to prevent a U.S.-led intervention, but it was instrumental in convincing Serbia to accede to NATO’s demands. 82 The only war between major powers to have occurred thus far in a unipolar world—the Kargil War between India and Pakistan—started, as my theory would have predicted, while the United States was involved in Kosovo. 83 In May 1999, India detected Pakistani forces intruding into the Kargil sector in Indian-controlled Kashmir. This action triggered the ªrst Indo-Pakistani war of the nuclear age, which ended on July 4—after the cessation of military operations in Kosovo—when President Bill Clinton demanded Pakistan’s withdrawal, which occurred on July 26. 84 In the absence of a great power sponsor and uncertain of U.S. intentions, Iran and North Korea—both recalcitrant minor powers—have made considerable efforts to bolster their relative power by developing a nuclear capability. Unsurprisingly, the United States has consistently opposed their efforts, but has so far been unable to persuade either to desist. The North Korean nuclear program dates to the 1960s, but most of the nuclear development was conducted in a world with a status quo unipole. 85 Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, North Korea sought to elude U.S. opposition without ever crossing the nuclear threshold. The North Korean regime seemed to have understood that the United States would view an explicit move toward a nuclear breakout as an extreme provocation and raise the possibility of a preventive war. When the United States shifted to a strategy of offensive dominance in late 2001, however, Pyongyang wasted little time in acquiring its nuclear deterrent. Iran, too, pursued a nuclear program throughout the 1990s. 86 The Iranian nuclear program, started in the 1950s, gained new impetus with the end of the Cold War as the result of a conºuence of factors: the 1989 replacement of an antinuclear supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, with a pronuclear Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; the discovery of Iraq’s covert nuclear program during the 1991 Gulf War; and, above all, an increased U.S. presence in the region following that war. 87 A decade later, the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program prompted the State Department to proclaim, “We believe Iran’s true intent is to develop the capability to produce ªssile material for nuclear weapons.” 88 Iran’s nuclear program continued throughout the period in which the United States shifted toward a strategy of offensive dominance, to which I turn next.

**Extinction**

**Asal and Beardsley 09** (Victor, Department of Political Science, State University of New York, Albany, and Kyle, Department of Political Science, Emory University, Winning with the Bomb, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/uploads/Beardsley-Asal_Winning_with_the_Bomb.pdf>)

Conclusion Why do states proliferate? Nuclear weapons and the programs necessary to create them are expensive. They are dangerous. Other countries may attack a state while it is trying to create a nuclear arsenal and there is always the risk of a catastrophic accident. They may help generate existential threats by encouraging first strike incentives amongst a state's opponents. This paper has explored the incentives that make nuclear weapons attractive to a wide range of states despite their costly and dangerous nature. We have found that nuclear weapons provide more than prestige, they provide leverage. They are useful in coercive diplomacy, and this must be central to any explanation of why states acquire them. Since 9 August 1945 no state has used a nuclear weapon against another state, but we find evidence that the possession of nuclear weapons helps states to succeed in their confrontations with other states even when they do not “use” them. Conflict with nuclear actors carries with it a potential danger that conflict with other states simply does not have. Even though the probability of full escalation is presumably low, the evidence confirms that the immense damage from the possibility of such escalation is enough to make an opponent eager to offer concessions. Asymmetric crises allow nuclear states to use their leverage to good effect. When crises involve a severe threat – and nuclear use is not completely ruled out – the advantage that nuclear actors have is substantial. Nuclear weapons help states win concessions quickly in 25 salient conflicts. Consistent with the other papers in this issue and the editors’ introduction (Gartzke and Kroenig this issue), we report that nuclear weapons confer tangible benefits to the possessors. These benefits imply that there should be a general level of demand for nuclear weapons, which means that explanations for why so few states have actually proliferated should focus more on the supply side, as applied by Matthew Kroenig (this issue) and Matthew Fuhrmann (this issue). The findings here importantly suggest an additional reason why “proliferation begets proliferation,” in the words of George Shultz (Shultz 1984, 18). If both parties to a crisis have nuclear weapons, the advantage is effectively cancelled out. When states develop nuclear weapons, doing so may encourage their rivals to also proliferate for fear of being exploited by the shifting bargaining positions. And once the rivals proliferate, the initial proliferator no longer has much bargaining advantage. On the one hand, this dynamic adds some restraint to initial proliferation within a rivalry relationship: states fear that their arsenal will encourage their rivals to pursue nuclear weapons, which will leave them no better off (Davis 1993; Cirincione 2007). On the other hand, once proliferation has occurred, all other states that are likely to experience coercive bargaining with the new nuclear state will also want nuclear weapons. The rate of proliferation has the potential to accelerate because the desire to posses the “equalizer” will increase as the number of nuclear powers slowly rises. Our theoretical framework and empirical findings are complementary to Gartzke and Jo (this issue), who posit and find that nuclear states enjoy greater influence in the international realm. An interesting dynamic emerges when comparing the results to Rauchhaus (this issue), who finds that nuclear weapons in asymmetric dyads tend to increase the propensity for escalation. We have argued that nuclear weapons improve the bargaining leverage of the 26 possessors and tested that proposition directly. It is important to note that the factors that shape conflict initiation and escalation are not necessarily the same factors that most shape the outcome of the conflict. Even so, one explanation for why a stronger bargaining position does not necessarily produce less escalation is that escalation is a function of decisions by both sides, and even though the opponent of a nuclear state is more willing to back down, the nuclear state should be more willing to raise its demands and push for a harder bargain in order to maximize the benefits from the nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons appear to need ever-greater shares of their bargains in order to be satisfied, which helps to explain both their proclivity to win and their proclivity toward aggressive coercive diplomacy. An important implication in light of these findings is thus that even though nuclear weapon states tend to fare better at the end of their crises, this does not necessarily mean that the weapons are a net benefit for peace and stability.

**Six constraints on U.S. action that make heg ineffective- balancing, legitimacy, timing, domestic constraints, sunk costs, and restraint**

**Legro 11** \*Jeffrey W Legro is Randolph P Compton Professor at the University of Virginia [Jeffrey W Legro (2011): The mix that makes unipolarity: hegemonic purpose

and international constraints, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 24:2, 185-199, July 26th]

Systemic constraints under unipolarity: not gone¶ We cannot, however, understand unipolarity through a sole focus on unipolar¶ purpose. This is because even under unipolarity when one country has immense¶ power and greater ability to shape the system, there are global conditions that¶ limit the desirability and efficacy of unipole effort.¶ Brooks and Wohlforth contend that this is not the case: a hegemon in a¶ unipolar world will not be subject to significant systemic constraints. Well, that is¶ their explicit argument, but they qualify it in a piecemeal way and when the pieces¶ are put together with others they do not consider, the picture may be a different¶ one. Their analysis fingers three constraints and there are at least three others that¶ escape their reach.5¶ The first constraint involves the potential that other countries will oppose the¶ hegemon under unipolarity. Brooks and Wohlforth suggest this need not happen.¶ They do an excellent job debunking the notion that balancing is constraining the¶ United States today. Yet they also acknowledge that balancing is possible if states¶ view their security as sufficiently challenged. At the extreme, if the United States¶ tried to ‘run the table’ with a strategy of global aggression and domination, Brooks¶ and Wohlforth do expect balancing. Thus the lack of balancing depends on a¶ perception that the United States is not likely to attempt domination. For example,¶ the United States, with a reputation for geopolitical restraint (even if diminished¶ in recent years), provokes less reaction than would a Napoleonic France or Fascist¶ Germany with the same power advantages. Balancing, therefore, can occur under¶ some circumstances (for example, different perceptions of hegemonic intent) even¶ in unipolarity.¶ Second, states will also constrain the United States if they have important¶ opposing interests not related to security. Brooks andWohlforth count this as part¶ of their argument as long as it does not involve the security concerns central to¶ balancing theory. Thus if other countries resist the United States due to economic¶ interests, regional security concerns, disagreements over non-security issues, or¶ domestic policy issues, this would not be security balancing or evidence against¶ their thesis.¶ In this view, the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership in the Shanghai¶ Cooperation Organization is not about offsetting the United States, but is instead¶ about arms sales and fighting terrorism in their region. Likewise, Russia’s ties to¶ Tehran have commercial and regional security roots. And opposition to the Iraq¶ War in places like Germany and Turkey is seen as a product of ‘long term domestic¶ political dynamics’ rather than a reaction to the concentration of US power.¶ Brooks andWohlforth’s argument is not that other countries will not constrain¶ the unipole; it is that they will not do so simply because of the unipole’s¶ extraordinary power. Yet it is clear that international order is dependent not just¶ on unipolarity but also on the distribution of interests. Variations in international¶ order, given a constant power distribution, may still occur if there are splits in¶ purpose between the hegemon and significant, if lesser, countries. Rifts between¶ the United States and Europe over such issues as UN reform, the WTO, and the¶ Middle East have hampered global governance and US aims in those areas¶ (Abdelal and Segal 2007). The structure of interests among major countries is a¶ constraint on US actions. Strategies, security or otherwise, that do not attend to¶ those interests will suffer.¶ Third, Brooks and Wohlforth’s analysis of legitimacy adds further caveats to¶ their argument. As with the other systemic constraints, they find that the need for¶ legitimacy does not provide a strong check on US policy. They do however¶ conclude that legitimacy is a ‘weakly conditional’ constraint. They insightfully¶ explore how dominant powers have many tools to shape strategically what¶ constitutes legitimacy and paper over the instances where they prefer to ignore¶ the rules. But ultimately hegemons ‘want and need rules and the legitimation¶ that they bring’ (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008, 207). Those rules for that very¶ reason must have some integrity. Hegemons, it might be said, can shape the¶ rules of order, but not always exactly as they please, and sometimes at significant¶ cost. The United States did not want to alter existing practices on landmines¶ but due to the Ottawa Treaty aimed at banning their use, it has had to spend¶ much money looking for military alternatives not to mention the international¶ and domestic political costs of resisting such a law (Finnemore 2009;¶ Landler 2010).¶ A fourth systemic constraint that deserves more weight involves¶ transaction and sunk costs that reduce incentives to change and or create¶ new institutions.6 One of the reasons the United States has not attempted a¶ redesign of international architecture may indeed be the heavy costs involved. For¶ example, NATO endures not because it is optimal to deal with the new threats¶ beyond Europe, but instead because it already exists and is too expensive to¶ reinvent. Other institutions that fit this vein include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation¶ Treaty and the United Nations. These institutions may not allow the United States¶ to get everything it wants but it would be even more costly to create new¶ institutions. Relative transactions (or sunk) costs contain Goliath.¶ The fifth systemic constraint is timing. It is easier for the top dog of international¶ politics to work its will in the international arena at some times versus others. For¶ example, it is often argued that major crises or wars present opportunities for¶ systemic transformation with little pushback (Krasner 1976; Ikenberry 2000; Olson¶ 1982; Higgs 1987; Goldstone 1991; Khong 1992). Thus the Concert of Europe came¶ out of the Napoleonic Wars, the League of Nations from World War I, the United¶ Nations fromWorldWar II, and so on. Such times involve conditions that facilitate¶ change including, not only an altered balance of power, but also war or economic¶ weariness, the desire to avoid prior problems, and the emergence of new domestic¶ coalitions and policy ideas. The general point is that the hegemon will be more or¶ less likely to receive pushback on its efforts to redo the international system¶ depending on whether extraordinary events act as an icebreaker on political¶ inertia. Timing has arguably not been favourable to unipolar revisionism with the¶ possible exception of post 9/11—an opportunity neutralized by the perceived¶ failure of the Bush doctrine. Absent such conditions, inertia tends to dominate and¶ a hegemon that recognizes this knows that changing the rules of the game will be¶ more difficult.¶ The sixth constraint involves domestic politics. Brooks and Wohlforth do note¶ that domestic resistance, not systemic constraints, might limit resources to pursue¶ activism. Their thesis, however, is about the lack of systemic constraints. What¶ deserves more attention, however, is the way that systemic factors in world¶ politics might inspire US domestic opposition to primacy. It seems that systemic¶ effects—perhaps other states opposing the United States, a loss of trading¶ privileges, or anti-American sentiment, arguably does mould US domestic¶ resistance to global projects.¶ For example, perhaps part of the reason for the turn of domestic opinion¶ against the policy activism of the ‘Bush doctrine’ related to the decline in US¶ international standing. The American public may view US international standing¶ as a type of performance criteria for presidents and administrations. There is some¶ evidence that US presidential approval ratings are influenced by satisfaction¶ rankings of the United States’ global position (Task Force on US Standing inWorld¶ Affairs 2009, 20–23). Standing functions as a proxy for presidential performance¶ and hence can be a constraint. Americans thought less of President Bush and his¶ agenda because the reaction abroad was so negative. Indeed, there have been¶ reports that Vice President Cheney believed Bush became too sensitive to public¶ opinion in the second term (Gellman 2009).¶ The cumulative effect of these six constraints—reputation for restraint,¶ interests, legitimacy, sunk costs, timing, and domestic externalities—seem to add¶ up to something more significant than merely an asterisk to the thesis that¶ systemic constraints are not binding. It appears that even under unipolarity, the¶ international system can limit the dominant power. Goliath may not be bound, but¶ the hurdles faced may discourage or channel action in ways that cannot be¶ understood without taking them into account.¶

**Hegemony is unnecessary and doesn’t solve anything**
**Preble 10 -** director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, taught history at St. Cloud State University and Temple University, was a commissioned officer in the U.S. Navy, Ph.D. in history from Temple University (Christopher, 8/13, “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?”) <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/>)
Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab. In short, we shouldn’t have expected that a group of Washington insiders would seek to overturn the judgments of another group of Washington insiders. A genuinely independent assessment of U.S. military spending, and of the strategy the military is designed to implement, must come from other quarters.

### Spills

#### Senate approved THA – squo solves

ESF 10/14 [Energy Solution Forum provides U.S. energy policy research and data services to support investment decisions across the broad energy industry, from oil & gas, to environmental commodities, renewables, and beyond. “Senate Approves Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement Bill” October 14, 2013 <http://www.energysolutionsforum.com/senate-approves-transboundary-hydrocarbons-agreement-bill/> accessed on October 21, 2013] JAKE LEE

On October 12, 2013, the Senate unanimously approved S. 812 to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to implement the 2012 U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement. The agreement establishes a legal framework for offshore drilling at the Gulf of Mexico maritime border. The Mexican Senate ratified the agreement two months after it was signed by the U.S. and Mexico in February 2012. The agreement requires U.S. ratification before the February 2014 expiration date. U.S.-Mexico-Transboundary-Hydrocarbon-Agreement. The legislation authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to take necessary actions to implement the agreement, including approval of unitization agreements and arrangements for oil and gas development from transboundary reservoirs and geological structures. It also approves disclosure of certain information related to oil and gas exploration, development, and production in the transboundary area. The agreement would open more than one million acres on the Outer Continental Shelf for oil and gas development and facilitate common safety and environmental standards, ensuring that either country retains authority over activity in its waters. Importantly, the agreement would provide the legal certainty required to encourage investment in new energy development. On October 1, American Petroleum Institute provided testimony commending the legislation to the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee. The House version of the legislation (H.R. 1613), approved by the House on June 27, includes a provision for exemption from Resources Extraction Reporting Requirement under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

#### Vote neg on presumption—they have evidence that the Senate and House have different bills but no evidence that some version won’t pass—means they have not met the burden of inherency—vote neg because noninherent affs destroy neg ground and make debate impossible

#### Narratives of environmental cataclysms create a representational bias that distracts from slow violence – turns the case

Nixon 07 – Rob, University of Wisconsin, Madison [“Slow Violence, Gender, and the Environmentalism

of the Poor” <http://www.english.wisc.edu/rdnixon/files/slow_violence.pdf>]

To confront what I am calling slow violence requires that we attempt to¶ give symbolic shape and plot to formless threats whose fatal repercussions¶ are dispersed across space and time. Politically and emotionally, different¶ kinds of disaster possess unequal heft. Falling bodies, burning towers,¶ exploding heads have a visceral, page-turning potency that tales of slow¶ violence cannot match. Stories of toxic buildup, massing greenhouse gases,¶ or desertification may be cataclysmic, but they're scientifically convoluted¶ cataclysms in which casualties are deferred, often for generations. In the¶ gap between acts of slow violence and their delayed effects both memory¶ and causation readily fade from view and the casualties thus incurred pass¶ untallied.¶ The long dyings that ensue from slow violence are out of sync not only¶ with our dramatic expectations, but with the swift seasons of electoral¶ change. How can leaders be goaded to avert catastrophe when the political¶ rewards of their actions will be reaped on someone else's watch, decades,¶ even centuries from now? How can environmental storytellers and activists¶ help counter the potent forces of political self-interest, procrastination,¶ and dissembling? We see such dissembling at work, for instance, in the¶ afterword to Michael Crichton's 2004 environmental conspiracy novel, State¶ of Fear, where he argues that we need twenty more years of data gathering on climate change before any policy decisions can be made (626). For his¶ pains, Crichton, though he lacked even an undergraduate science degree,¶ was appointed to President Bush's special committee on climate change.¶ The oxymoronic notion of slow violence poses representational,¶ statistical, and legislative challenges. The under-representation of slow¶ violence in the media results in the discounting of casualties-from, for¶ example, the toxic aftermaths of wars-which in turn exacerbates the¶ difficulty of securing effective legal measures for preemption, restitution,¶ and redress.¶ The representational challenges are acute, requiring creative ways of¶ drawing public attention to catastrophic acts that are low in instant spectacle¶ but high in long-term effects. To intervene representationally requires that¶ we find both the iconic symbols to embody amorphous calamities and the¶ narrative forms to infuse them with dramatic urgency. In an age of degraded¶ attention spans it becomes doubly difficult to focus on the toll exacted, over¶ time, by ecological degradation. We live, as Microsoft executive Linda Stone¶ puts it, in an age of "continuous partial attention" (qtd. in Friedman A27).¶ Fast is faster than it used to be and story units have become concomitantly¶ shorter. In this cultural milieu, the intergenerational aftermath becomes a¶ harder sell. So to render slow violence visible entails, among other things,¶ redefining speed: we see such efforts in talk of accelerated species loss, rapid¶ climate change, and in attempts to recast "glacial"--once a dead metaphor¶ for slow-as a rousing, iconic image of unacceptably fast loss.¶ Efforts to infuse slow violence with an urgent visibility suffered a¶ setback in America with the events of 9/11, which reinforced a narrow¶ image of what it means to be at risk-as a nation, a species, and a planet.¶ The fiery spectacle of the collapsing towers was burned into the national¶ psyche as the definitive image of violence, exacerbating for years the¶ difficulty of rallying public sentiment against attritional violence like global¶ warming, a threat that is both incremental and exponential. Condoleezza¶ Rice's strategic fantasy of a mushroom cloud suspended over America if the¶ United States failed to invade Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein gave further¶ visual definition to the idea of cataclysmic violence as something explosive¶ and instantaneous, a recognizably cinematic, pyrotechnic event. The representational bias against slow violence has statistical ramifications; under-represented casualties – human and environmental - ¶ are the casualties most likely to be discounted. We see this, for instance, in the way wars whose lethal repercussions sprawl across space and time are¶ tidily book-ended in the historical record.¶ A 2003 New York Times editorial¶ on Vietnam reported, "during our dozen years there, the U.S. killed and¶ helped kill at least 1.5 million people" ("Vietnam" A25). That simple word¶ "during," however, shrinks the toll: hundreds of thousands survived the¶ war years, only to lose their lives prematurely to Agent Orange. In a 2002¶ study, the environmental scientist Arnold Schecter recorded dioxin levels¶ in the bloodstreams of Bien Hoa residents at 135 times the levels of Hanoi's¶ inhabitants, who lived far north of the spraying (Schecter 516). The afflicted¶ include thousands of children born decades after the war's end. More than¶ thirty years after the last spraying run, Agent Orange continues to wreak¶ havoc as, through biomagnification, dioxins build up in the fatty tissues of¶ pivotal foods like duck and fish and pass from the natural world into the¶ cooking pot and from there to ensuing human generations. "During": a¶ small word, yet a powerful reminder of how easily the belated casualties of¶ slow violence are habitually screened from view.

#### Their evidence doesn’t have a brink—overfishing and destruction make destruction inevitable

#### The entire adv is non-unique – just had a spill

**Skaggs 7-9-13** (Christina, “US Coast Guard confirms natural gas leak in Gulf of Mexico”, July 9th, 2013, http://www.wlox.com/story/22797968/us-coast-guard-confirms-natural-gas-leak-in-gulf-of-mexico)

The U.S. Coast Guard confirmed a natural gas leak In the Gulf of Mexico has forced the evacuation of a gas production platform 74 miles southwest of Port Fourchon, LA. According to the Coast Guard, the leak began Sunday at Ship Shoal Block 225 platform B, which is a natural gas and crude oil platform owned by Energy Resources Technology (ERT).¶ The Coast Guard and Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) are responding to what the Coast Guard calls "the loss of well control".¶ Once ERT learned of the leak, the company began work to temporarily plug the well and contacted the Coast Guard and BSEE, according to Coast Guard officials.¶ The Coast Guard and BSEE inspectors conducted overflights early Tuesday. Coast Guard officials said rainbow sheen runs more than four miles wide by three quarters of a mile long. Coast Guard and BSEE will conduct an investigation of the incident to determine the cause of the loss of well control.

Alt cause - Cuba

Almeida ‘12

Rob Almeida is Partner/CMO at gCaptain. He graduated from the US Naval Academy in 1999 with a B.S in Naval Architecture and spent 6.5 years on active duty as a Surface Warfare Officer. He worked for a year as a Roughneck/Rig Manager trainee on board the drillship Discoverer Americas. May 18th – http://gcaptain.com/drilling-cuba-embargo-badly/

In short however, Cuba’s access to containment systems, offshore technology, and spill response equipment is severely restricted by the US embargo, yet if a disaster occurs offshore, not only will Cuban ecosystems be severely impacted, but those of the Florida Keys, and US East Coast.¶ If disaster strikes offshore Cuba, US citizens will have nobody else to blame except the US Government because outdated policies are impacting the ability to prepare sufficiently for real-life environmental threats. Considering Cuba waters are home to the highest concentration of biodiversity in the region and is a spawning ground for fish populations that migrate north into US waters, a Cuban oil spill could inflict unprecedented environmental devastation if not planned for in advance.

#### Gulf is resilient

**Berywn 13** (Bob, Summit County Voice, “Environment: Is the Gulf of Mexico resilient to oil spills?”, April 9th, 2013, http://summitcountyvoice.com/2013/04/09/environment-is-the-gulf-of-mexico-resilient-to-oil-spills/)

Nearly three years after the Deepwater Horizon drill rig exploded and the busted Macondo Well spewed millions of gallons of crude into the Gulf of Mexico, scientists are still trying to figure out to what happened to all the oil.¶ Only a tiny amount was captured or burned at the surface, and vast quantity — nobody knows exactly how much — was “dispersed” with chemicals injected directly into the stream of oil streaming out of the broken pipes, but a surprisingly large percentage of the oil may have been broken down by microbes.¶ Some of the oil settled to the seafloor, damaging coral miles from the site of the disaster. There’s also evidence that the oil damaged Gulf of Mexico oysters growing in coastal areas, and sickened dolphins in Barataria Bay. And in Florida, researchers found remnants of the oil lingering in “scary high” concentrations in the splash zone along Gulf beaches.¶ But overall, the Gulf may be more resilient than previously believed, according to Terry Hazen a bioremediation expert at the University of Tennessee-Oak Ridge National Laboratory.¶ Hazen and his research team used a powerful new approach for identifying microbes in the environment to discover previously unknown and naturally occurring bacteria that consume and break down crude oil. They concluded that there was a population explosion among those bacteria already adapted to using oil as a food source.¶ “It was surprising how fast they consumed the oil,” Hazen said. “In some locations, it took only one day for them to reduce a gallon of oil to a half gallon. In others, the half-life for a given quantity of spilled oil was six days … “The Deepwater Horizon oil provided a new source of nutrients in the deepest waters,” he said.¶ Rather than culturing the microbes in a lab, the researchers combined genetic data and other analyses of the DNA, proteins and other footprints of bacteria to provide a more detailed picture of microbial life in the water.¶ Their findings suggest that a great potential for intrinsic bioremediation of oil plumes exists in the deep sea and other environs in the Gulf of Mexico. Oil-eating bacteria are natural inhabitants of the Gulf because of the constant supply of oil as food.¶ “The bottom line from this research may be that the Gulf of Mexico is more resilient and better able to recover from oil spills than anyone thought,” Hazen said. “It shows that we may not need the kinds of heroic measures proposed after the Deepwater Horizon spill, like adding nutrients to speed up the growth of bacteria that break down oil or using genetically engineered bacteria. The Gulf has a broad base of natural bacteria, and they respond to the presence of oil by multiplying quite rapidly.”¶ Hazen recently presented his Deepwater Horizon disaster research findings at the 245th National Meeting and Exposition of the American Chemical Society, the world’s largest scientific society.

#### Climate change proves Oceans and marine bioD are resilient – alarmist predictions empirically denied

Taylor 10 [James M. Taylor is a senior fellow of The Heartland Institute and managing editor of Environment & Climate News., “Ocean Acidification Scare Pushed at Copenhagen,” Feb 10 http://www.heartland.org/publications/environment%20climate/article/26815/Ocean\_Acidification\_Scare\_Pushed\_at\_Copenhagen.html]

With global temperatures continuing their decade-long decline and United Nations-sponsored global warming talks falling apart in Copenhagen, alarmists at the U.N. talks spent considerable time claiming carbon dioxide emissions will cause catastrophic ocean acidification, regardless of whether temperatures rise. The latest scientific data, however, show no such catastrophe is likely to occur. Food Supply Risk Claimed The United Kingdom’s environment secretary, Hilary Benn, initiated the Copenhagen ocean scare with a high-profile speech and numerous media interviews claiming ocean acidification threatens the world’s food supply. “The fact is our seas absorb CO2. They absorb about a quarter of the total that we produce, but it is making our seas more acidic,” said Benn in his speech. “If this continues as a problem, then it can affect the one billion people who depend on fish as their principle source of protein, and we have to feed another 2½ to 3 billion people over the next 40 to 50 years.” Benn’s claim of oceans becoming “more acidic” is misleading, however. Water with a pH of 7.0 is considered neutral. pH values lower than 7.0 are considered acidic, while those higher than 7.0 are considered alkaline. The world’s oceans have a pH of 8.1, making them alkaline, not acidic. Increasing carbon dioxide concentrations would make the oceans less alkaline but not acidic. Since human industrial activity first began emitting carbon dioxide into the atmosphere a little more than 200 years ago, the pH of the oceans has fallen merely 0.1, from 8.2 to 8.1. Following Benn’s December 14 speech and public relations efforts, most of the world’s major media outlets produced stories claiming ocean acidification is threatening the world’s marine life. An Associated Press headline, for example, went so far as to call ocean acidification the “evil twin” of climate change. Studies Show CO2 Benefits Numerous recent scientific studies show higher carbon dioxide levels in the world’s oceans have the same beneficial effect on marine life as higher levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide have on terrestrial plant life. In a 2005 study published in the Journal of Geophysical Research, scientists examined trends in chlorophyll concentrations, critical building blocks in the oceanic food chain. The French and American scientists reported “an overall increase of the world ocean average chlorophyll concentration by about 22 percent” during the prior two decades of increasing carbon dioxide concentrations. In a 2006 study published in Global Change Biology, scientists observed higher CO2 levels are correlated with better growth conditions for oceanic life. The highest CO2 concentrations produced “higher growth rates and biomass yields” than the lower CO2 conditions. Higher CO2 levels may well fuel “subsequent primary production, phytoplankton blooms, and sustaining oceanic food-webs,” the study concluded. Ocean Life ‘Surprisingly Resilient’ In a 2008 study published in Biogeosciences, scientists subjected marine organisms to varying concentrations of CO2, including abrupt changes of CO2 concentration. The ecosystems were “surprisingly resilient” to changes in atmospheric CO2, and “the ecosystem composition, bacterial and phytoplankton abundances and productivity, grazing rates and total grazer abundance and reproduction were not significantly affected by CO2-induced effects.” In a 2009 study published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, scientists reported, “Sea star growth and feeding rates increased with water temperature from 5ºC to 21ºC. A doubling of current [CO2] also increased growth rates both with and without a concurrent temperature increase from 12ºC to 15ºC.” Another False CO2 Scare “Far too many predictions of CO2-induced catastrophes are treated by alarmists as sure to occur, when real-world observations show these doomsday scenarios to be highly unlikely or even virtual impossibilities,” said Craig Idso, Ph.D., author of the 2009 book CO2, Global Warming and Coral Reefs. “The phenomenon of CO2-induced ocean acidification appears to be no different.

**No impact to** environment **- 99.9% can die and no impact**

Sagoff 97Mark, Senior Research Scholar – Institute for Philosophy and Public policy in School of Public Affairs – U. Maryland, William and Mary Law Review, “Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law Symposium Defining Takings: Private Property And The Future Of Government Regulation: Muddle Or Muddle Through? Takings Jurisprudence Meets The Endangered Species Act”, 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 825, March, L/N

Although one may agree with ecologists such as Ehrlich and Raven that the earth stands on the brink of an episode of massive extinction, it may not follow from this grim fact that human beings will suffer as a result. On the contrary, skeptics such as science writer Colin Tudge have challenged biologists to explain why we need more than a tenth of the 10 to 100 million species that grace the earth. Noting that "cultivated systems often out-produce wild systems by 100-fold or more," Tudge declared that "the argument that humans need the variety of other species is, when you think about it, a theological one." n343 Tudge observed that "the elimination of all but a tiny minority of our fellow creatures does not affect the material well-being of humans one iota." n344 This skeptic challenged ecologists to list more than 10,000 species (other than unthreatened microbes) that are essential to ecosystem productivity or functioning. n345 "The human species could survive just as well if 99.9% of our fellow creatures went extinct, provided only that we retained the appropriate 0.1% that we need." n346   [\*906]   The monumental Global Biodiversity Assessment ("the Assessment") identified two positions with respect to redundancy of species. "At one extreme is the idea that each species is unique and important, such that its removal or loss will have demonstrable consequences to the functioning of the community or ecosystem." n347 The authors of the Assessment, a panel of eminent ecologists, endorsed this position, saying it is "unlikely that there is much, if any, ecological redundancy in communities over time scales of decades to centuries, the time period over which environmental policy should operate." n348 These eminent ecologists rejected the opposing view, "the notion that species overlap in function to a sufficient degree that removal or loss of a species will be compensated by others, with negligible overall consequences to the community or ecosystem." n349  Other biologists believe, however, that species are so fabulously redundant in the ecological functions they perform that the life-support systems and processes of the planet and ecological processes in general will function perfectly well with fewer of them, certainly fewer than the millions and millions we can expect to remain even if every threatened organism becomes extinct. n350 Even the kind of sparse and miserable world depicted in the movie Blade Runner could provide a "sustainable" context for the human economy as long as people forgot their aesthetic and moral commitment to the glory and beauty of the natural world. n351 The Assessment makes this point. "Although any ecosystem contains hundreds to thousands of species interacting among themselves and their physical environment, the emerging consensus is that the system is driven by a small number of . . . biotic variables on whose interactions the balance of species are, in a sense, carried along." n352   [\*907]   To make up your mind on the question of the functional redundancy of species, consider an endangered species of bird, plant, or insect and ask how the ecosystem would fare in its absence. The fact that the creature is endangered suggests an answer: it is already in limbo as far as ecosystem processes are concerned. What crucial ecological services does the black-capped vireo, for example, serve? Are any of the species threatened with extinction necessary to the provision of any ecosystem service on which humans depend? If so, which ones are they?  Ecosystems and the species that compose them have changed, dramatically, continually, and totally in virtually every part of the United States. There is little ecological similarity, for example, between New England today and the land where the Pilgrims died. n353 In view of the constant reconfiguration of the biota, one may wonder why Americans have not suffered more as a result of ecological catastrophes. The cast of species in nearly every environment changes constantly-local extinction is commonplace in nature-but the crops still grow. Somehow, it seems, property values keep going up on Martha's Vineyard in spite of the tragic disappearance of the heath hen.  One might argue that the sheer number and variety of creatures available to any ecosystem buffers that system against stress. Accordingly, we should be concerned if the "library" of creatures ready, willing, and able to colonize ecosystems gets too small. (Advances in genetic engineering may well permit us to write a large number of additions to that "library.") In the United States as in many other parts of the world, however, the number of species has been increasing dramatically, not decreasing, as a result of human activity. This is because the hordes of exotic species coming into ecosystems in the United States far exceed the number of species that are becoming extinct. Indeed, introductions may outnumber extinctions by more than ten to one, so that the United States is becoming more and more species-rich all the time largely as a result of human action. n354 [\*908] Peter Vitousek and colleagues estimate that over 1000 non-native plants grow in California alone; in Hawaii there are 861; in Florida, 1210. n355 In Florida more than 1000 non-native insects, 23 species of mammals, and about 11 exotic birds have established themselves. n356 Anyone who waters a lawn or hoes a garden knows how many weeds desire to grow there, how many birds and bugs visit the yard, and how many fungi, creepy-crawlies, and other odd life forms show forth when it rains. All belong to nature, from wherever they might hail, but not many homeowners would claim that there are too few of them. Now, not all exotic species provide ecosystem services; indeed, some may be disruptive or have no instrumental value. n357 This also may be true, of course, of native species as well, especially because all exotics are native somewhere. Certain exotic species, however, such as Kentucky blue grass, establish an area's sense of identity and place; others, such as the green crabs showing up around Martha's Vineyard, are nuisances. n358 Consider an analogy [\*909] with human migration. Everyone knows that after a generation or two, immigrants to this country are hard to distinguish from everyone else. The vast majority of Americans did not evolve here, as it were, from hominids; most of us "came over" at one time or another. This is true of many of our fellow species as well, and they may fit in here just as well as we do. It is possible to distinguish exotic species from native ones for a period of time, just as we can distinguish immigrants from native-born Americans, but as the centuries roll by, species, like people, fit into the landscape or the society, changing and often enriching it. Shall we have a rule that a species had to come over on the Mayflower, as so many did, to count as "truly" American? Plainly not. When, then, is the cutoff date? Insofar as we are concerned with the absolute numbers of "rivets" holding ecosystems together, extinction seems not to pose a general problem because a far greater number of kinds of mammals, insects, fish, plants, and other creatures thrive on land and in water in America today than in prelapsarian times. n359 The Ecological Society of America has urged managers to maintain biological diversity as a critical component in strengthening ecosystems against disturbance. n360 Yet as Simon Levin observed, "much of the detail about species composition will be irrelevant in terms of influences on ecosystem properties." n361 [\*910] He added: "For net primary productivity, as is likely to be the case for any system property, biodiversity matters only up to a point; above a certain level, increasing biodiversity is likely to make little difference." n362 What about the use of plants and animals in agriculture? There is no scarcity foreseeable. "Of an estimated 80,000 types of plants [we] know to be edible," a U.S. Department of the Interior document says, "only about 150 are extensively cultivated." n363 About twenty species, not one of which is endangered, provide ninety percent of the food the world takes from plants. n364 Any new food has to take "shelf space" or "market share" from one that is now produced. Corporations also find it difficult to create demand for a new product; for example, people are not inclined to eat paw-paws, even though they are delicious. It is hard enough to get people to eat their broccoli and lima beans. It is harder still to develop consumer demand for new foods. This may be the reason the Kraft Corporation does not prospect in remote places for rare and unusual plants and animals to add to the world's diet. Of the roughly 235,000 flowering plants and 325,000 nonflowering plants (including mosses, lichens, and seaweeds) available, farmers ignore virtually all of them in favor of a very few that are profitable. n365 To be sure, any of the more than 600,000 species of plants could have an application in agriculture, but would they be preferable to the species that are now dominant? Has anyone found any consumer demand for any of these half-million or more plants to replace rice or wheat in the human diet? There are reasons that farmers cultivate rice, wheat, and corn rather than, say, Furbish's lousewort. There are many kinds of louseworts, so named because these weeds were thought to cause lice in sheep. How many does agriculture really require? [\*911] The species on which agriculture relies are domesticated, not naturally occurring; they are developed by artificial not natural selection; they might not be able to survive in the wild. n366 This argument is not intended to deny the religious, aesthetic, cultural, and moral reasons that command us to respect and protect the natural world. These spiritual and ethical values should evoke action, of course, but we should also recognize that they are spiritual and ethical values. We should recognize that ecosystems and all that dwell therein compel our moral respect, our aesthetic appreciation, and our spiritual veneration; we should clearly seek to achieve the goals of the ESA. There is no reason to assume, however, that these goals have anything to do with human well-being or welfare as economists understand that term. These are ethical goals, in other words, not economic ones. Protecting the marsh may be the right thing to do for moral, cultural, and spiritual reasons. We should do it-but someone will have to pay the costs. In the narrow sense of promoting human welfare, protecting nature often represents a net "cost," not a net "benefit." It is largely for moral, not economic, reasons-ethical, not prudential, reasons- that we care about all our fellow creatures. They are valuable as objects of love not as objects of use. What is good for   [\*912]  the marsh may be good in itself even if it is not, in the economic sense, good for mankind. The most valuable things are quite useless.

**No Extinction –**

**a.) Scientifically disproven**

**Dodds 2K** - M.S. P.E., President of North Pacific Research (Donald, “The Myth of Biodiversity”)

Biodiversity is a corner stone of the environmental movement. But there is no proof that biodiversity is important to the environment. Something without basis in scientific fact is called a Myth. Lets examine biodiversity through out the history of the earth. The earth has been a around for about 4 billion years. Life did not develop until about 500 million years later. Thus for the first 500 million years bio diversity was zero. The planet somehow survived this lack of biodiversity. For the next 3 billion years, the only life on the planet was microbial and not diverse. Thus, the first unexplainable fact is that the earth existed for 3.5 billion years, 87.5% of its existence, without biodiversity. Somewhere around 500 million years ago life began to diversify and multiple celled species appeared. Because these species were partially composed of sold material they left better geologic records, and the number of species and genera could be cataloged and counted. The number of genera on the planet is a indication of the biodiversity of the planet. Figure 1 is a plot of the number of genera on the planet over the last 550 million years. The little black line outside of the left edge of the graph is 10 million years. Notice the left end of this graph. Biodiversity has never been higher than it is today.

**b.) Empirically denied**

**Moore 98** – (Thomas Gale, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, Climate of Fear, 98-99)

Nevertheless, the loss of a class of living beings does not typically threaten other species. Most animals and plants can derive their nutrients or receive the other benefits provided by a particular species from more than a single source. If it were true that the extinction of a single species would produce a cascade of losses, then the massive extinctions of the past should have wiped out all life. Evolution forces various life forms to adjust to change. A few may not make the adaptation but others will mutate to meet the new conditions. Although a particular chain of DNA may be eliminated through the loss of a species, other animals or plants adapting to the same environment often produce similar genetic solutions with like proteins. It is almost impossible to imagine a single species that, if eliminated, would threaten us humans. Perhaps if the *E. coli* that are necessary for digestion became extinct, we could no longer exist. But those bacteria live in a symbiotic relationship with man and, as long as humans survive, so will they. Thus any animal that hosts a symbiotic species need not fear the loss of its partner. As long as the host remains, so will parasites and symbiotic species.

**The Environment is adaptable**

**a.) Redundancy**

**Maser 92** – Internationally recognized expert in forest ecology and governmental consultant (Chris, “Global Imperative: Harmonizing Culture and Nature”, p. 40)

Redundancy means that more than one species can perform similar functions. It’s a type of ecological insurance policy, which strengthens the ability of the system to retain the integrity of its basic relationships. The insurance of redundancy means that the loss of a species or two is not likely to result in such severe functional disruptions of the ecosystem so as to cause its collapse because other species can make up for the functional loss.

**b.) Innovation solves**

**DOREMUS 2k** – Professor of Law at UC Davis, (Holly, Washington & Lee Law Review, "The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse," 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11, Winter 2000)

In recent years, this discourse frequently has taken the form of the ecological horror story . That too is no mystery. The ecological horror story is unquestionably an attention-getter, especially in the hands of skilled writers [\*46] like Carson and the Ehrlichs. The image of the airplane earth, its wings wobbling as rivet after rivet is carelessly popped out, is difficult to ignore. The apocalyptic depiction of an impending crisis of potentially dire proportions is designed to spur the political community to quick action . Furthermore, this story suggests a goal that appeals to many nature lovers: that virtually everything must be protected. To reinforce this suggestion, tellers of the ecological horror story often imply that the relative importance of various rivets to the ecological plane cannot be determined. They offer reams of data and dozens of anecdotes demonstrating the unexpected value of apparently useless parts of nature. The moth that saved Australia from prickly pear invasion, the scrubby Pacific yew, and the downright unattractive leech are among the uncharismatic flora and fauna who star in these anecdotes. n211 The moral is obvious: because we cannot be sure which rivets are holding the plane together, saving them all is the only sensible course.

Notwithstanding its attractions, the material discourse in general, and the ecological horror story in particular, are not likely to generate policies that will satisfy nature lovers. The ecological horror story implies that there is no reason to protect nature until catastrophe looms. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper account, for example, presents species simply as the (fungible) hardware holding together the ecosystem. If we could be reasonably certain that a particular rivet was not needed to prevent a crash, the rivet-popper story suggests that we would lose very little by pulling it out. Many environmentalists, though, would disagree. n212

Reluctant to concede such losses, tellers of the ecological horror story highlight how close a catastrophe might be, and how little we know about what actions might trigger one. But the apocalyptic vision is less credible today than it seemed in the 1970s. Although it is clear that the earth is experiencing a mass wave of extinctions, n213 the complete elimination of life on earth seems unlikely. n214 Life is remarkably robust. Nor is human extinction probable any time soon. Homo sapiens is adaptable to nearly any environment. Even if the world of the future includes far fewer species, it likely will hold people. n215

One response to this credibility problem tones the story down a bit, arguing not that humans will go extinct but that ecological disruption will bring economies, and consequently civilizations, to their knees. n216 But this too may be overstating the case. Most ecosystem functions are performed by multiple species. This functional redundancy means that a high proportion of species can be lost without precipitating a collapse. n217

**Biodiversity loss is exaggerated**

**Lomberg 01 –** associate professor of statistics in the Department of Political Science at the University of Aarhus, Denmark (Bjorn, August 9, “Environmentalists tend to believe that, ecologically speaking, things are getting worse and worse.”<http://74.125.95.132/search?q=cache:754-vC_Td94J:www.warwickhughes.com/climate/lomborg2.htm+biodiversity+exaggerated&cd=46&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>)

Dr Ehrlich's prediction echoed that made 170 years earlier by Thomas Malthus. Malthus claimed that, if unchecked, human population would expand exponentially, while food production could increase only linearly, by bringing new land into cultivation. He was wrong. Population growth has turned out to have an internal check: as people grow richer and healthier, they have smaller families. Indeed, the growth rate of the human population reached its peak, of more than 2% a year, in the early 1960s. The rate of increase has been declining ever since. It is now 1.26%, and is expected to fall to 0.46% in 2050. Malthus also failed to take account of developments in agricultural technology. These have squeezed more and more food out of each hectare of land. It is this application of human ingenuity that has boosted food production, not merely in line with, but ahead of, population growth. It has also, incidentally, reduced the need to take new land into cultivation, thus reducing the pressure on biodiversity. Third, that threat of biodiversity loss is real, but exaggerated. Most early estimates used simple island models that linked a loss in habitat with a loss of biodiversity. A rule-of-thumb indicated that loss of 90% of forest meant a 50% loss of species. As rainforests seemed to be cut at alarming rates, estimates of annual species loss of 20,000-100,000 abounded. Many people expected the number of species to fall by half globally within a generation or two. However, the data simply does not bear out these predictions. In the eastern United States, forests were reduced over two centuries to fragments totalling just 1-2% of their original area, yet this resulted in the extinction of only one forest bird. In Puerto Rico, the primary forest area has been reduced over the past 400 years by 99%, yet “only” seven of 60 species of bird has become extinct. All but 12% of the Brazilian Atlantic rainforest was cleared in the 19th century, leaving only scattered fragments. According to the rule-of-thumb, half of all its species should have become extinct. Yet, when the World Conservation Union and the Brazilian Society of Zoology analysed all 291 known Atlantic forest animals, none could be declared extinct. Species, therefore, seem more resilient than expected. And tropical forests are not lost at annual rates of 2-4%, as many environmentalists have claimed: the latest UN figures indicate a loss of less than 0.5%.

## 2NC

### 2NC – Heg

**The turns outweigh the benefits to hegemony-**

**First, our offense.**

**2 Major disads.**

**First is prolif-**

**1.) Proliferation – states seek security by attempting to proliferate and acquire nuclear weapons, leads to arms race and war – Iran and North Korea prove –**

**That escalates to nuclear war through accidents – it outweighs their claims because it increases the degree of the war if more countries have nuclear weapons – that’s akin**

**That turns heg-**

**Proliferation limits the relative power of the u.s. which means it cannot successfully exercise hegemony**

**More ev – link turns don’t apply**

**Mearsheimer 10** \*John, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago [“Imperial by Design,” National Interest Magazine]

IF ALL of this were not enough, global dominance, especially the Bush administration’s penchant for big-stick diplomacy, negatively affects nuclear proliferation as well. The United States is deeply committed to making sure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear arsenal and that North Korea gives up its atomic weapons, but the strategy we have employed is likely to have the opposite effect. The main reason that a country acquires nuclear weapons is that they are the ultimate deterrent. It is extremely unlikely that any state would attack the homeland of a nuclear-armed adversary because of the fear that it would prompt nuclear retaliation. Therefore, any country that feels threatened by a dangerous rival has good reason to want a survivable nuclear deterrent. This basic logic explains why the United States and the Soviet Union built formidable stockpiles during the Cold War. It also explains why Israel acquired atomic weapons and refuses to give them up. All of this tells you that when the United States places Iran, Iraq and North Korea on the “axis of evil” and threatens them with military force, it gives those countries a powerful incentive to acquire a nuclear deterrent. The Bush administration, for example, would not have invaded Iraq in March 2003 if Saddam had an atomic arsenal because the Iraqi leader probably would have used it, since he almost certainly was going to die anyway. It is not clear whether Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons today, but given that the United States and Israel frequently hint that they might attack it nevertheless, the regime has good reason to want a deterrent to protect itself. Similarly, Pyongyang would be foolish to give up its nuclear capability in the absence of some sort of rapprochement with Washington. And there is no good reason to think that spreading democracy would counter proliferation either. After all, five of the nine nuclear-armed states are democracies (Britain, France, India, Israel and the United States), and two others (Pakistan and Russia) are borderline democracies that retain significant authoritarian features. In short, the Bush administration’s fondness for threatening to attack adversaries (oftentimes with the additional agenda of forced democratization) encouraged nuclear proliferation. The best way for the United States to maximize the prospects of halting or at least slowing down the spread of nuclear weapons would be to stop threatening other countries because that gives them a compelling reason to acquire the ultimate deterrent. But as long as America’s leaders remain committed to global dominance, they are likely to resist this advice and keep threatening states that will not follow Washington’s orders.

**Second is war-**

**Recalcitrant powers become belligerent and start wars in three ways**

**a.) Recalcitrant Revisionism – hegemonic interference in regional affairs means that minor powers seek to usurp the status quo by attacking the US – Japan’s bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941 proves our claims**

**b.) Miscalculation– uncertainty about how aggressive the unipol will be and how willing it is to accept small revisions means that states are uniquely likely to miscalculate – Gulf War, Kosovo prove –**

 **c.) Offensive Revisionism**

**Monteiro 11** \*Nuno P. Monteiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University [<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064>, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful”]

A unipole carrying out an offensive-dominance strategy wants to revise the status quo in its favor by acquiring more territory, by favorably changing the alignment of other states, or by altering the distribution of power in its own benefit—or some combination of these. Territorial conquest, which is the most ambitious goal of an offensivedominance strategy, is a daunting task in an age of nationalism and is thus likely to be rare.89 Efforts to alter the international alignments of other states or the balance of power can be pursued through soft power and persuasion, but this is unlikely to prove sufficient, and the unipole may decide to use force.90 By putting recalcitrant minor powers in a position of extreme-self help, an offensive-dominance strategy triggers two pathways to conflict. In both cases, a deterrence breakdown leads to a preventive war. Following the first pathway: the unipole makes revisionist demands that recalcitrant minor powers are unlikely to accept peacefully, because these pose a threat to their survival. Given its preponderance of power, the unipole may decide to go to war. The second causal pathway follows a slightly more complex logic. Like its defensive version, a strategy of offensive dominance provides strong incentives for recalcitrant minor powers to balance internally. These attempts to bolster their relative power, however, are likely to lead to war with the unipole before the recalcitrant power is able to acquire additional capabilities. The reason for this outcome is that the unipole will oppose any attempt by minor powers to revise the status quo in a way that is detrimental to its interests. In addition, wars pitting a recalcitrant minor power against a unipole implementing a strategy of offensive dominance have two effects common to defensive dominance. First, they encourage other recalcitrant minor powers to redouble their balancing efforts. Second, they may make room for wars among major and minor powers. Reacting to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States adopted a strategy of offensive dominance in the Middle East. Although this short period has produced only a slim empirical record that can be harnessed to support my theory, the mechanisms I posit can best be seen at work in the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. The United States’ goal was to revise Iraq’s international alignment and decrease its relative power by installing an accommodating regime in Baghdad and ending Saddam’s putative weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program.91 In the end, no WMD were found after the invasion.92 Still, Saddam had possessed a nuclear program, which he stopped only grudgingly when UNimposed sanctions in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War made it impossible to acquire the materials and technology needed for a nuclear deterrent.93 Indeed, the possibility of Iraq acquiring nuclear weapons, which Washington was convinced would soon become a reality, featured prominently in the George W. Bush administration’s argument for going to war.94 Although confronted with an imminent invasion, Saddam refused to back down. His rationale seems to have been based on his estimate that, ªrst, France or Russia would intercede on Iraq’s behalf, preventing war and, second, if that failed, Iraqi forces would be capable of increasing the military costs for the United States to the point at which American public opinion would force Washington to back down.95 None of this happened. China, France, and Russia—all major powers—did oppose UN authorization to use force against Iraq, but when the United States displayed an unequivocal determination to invade anyway, no major power did much to stop it.96 Ultimately, U.S.-led coalition troops toppled Saddam’s regime in three weeks, and major military operations ended within a month of the invasion date. The IraqWar also led other recalcitrant minor powers to accelerate their proliferation attempts. Having been identiªed by President Bush, alongside Iraq, as members of the “axis of evil,” Iran and North Korea were particularly quick to respond.97 A mere two weeks after the fall of Baghdad, Pyongyang ofªcials informed their American counterparts that North Korea possessed nuclear weapons, making the country immune to any U.S. attempts to depose its regime. 98 Iran, too, has ramped up its nuclear program since 2002 and is likely to continue pursuing a nuclear capability while trying to avoid preventive action by the United States.99 Unfortunately for the prospects of peace, it is also likely the United States will oppose this development and, if necessary, resort to the use of force.100

**Turns heg through Overreach**

**If we win a risk of war it means the unipol is distracted and cannot deter wars between other powers – empirics prove – Kosovo intervention was the only time a great power war was fought between India and Pakistan**

**Unipolarity destroys coordination necessary to stop the next epidemic-abandoning heg solves**

**Weber et al. 7 \***Steven Weber is a Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies, Naazneen Barma, Matthew Kroenig, Ely Ratner, [“How Globalization Went Bad”, January-February 2007, Foreign Policy]

The same is true for global public health. Globalization is turning the world into an enormous petri dish for the incubation of infectious disease. Humans cannot outsmart disease, because it just evolves too quickly. Bacteria can reproduce a new generation in less than 30 minutes, while it takes us decades to come up with a new generation of antibiotics. **Solutions are only possible when and where we get the upper hand**. Poor countries where humans live in close proximity to farm animals are the best place to breed extremely dangerous zoonotic disease. **These are often the same countries, perhaps not entirely coincidentally, that feel threatened by American powe**r. Establishing an early warning system for these diseases—exactly what we lacked in the case of SARS a few years ago and exactly what we lack for avian flu today—will require a significant level of intervention into the very places that don’t want it. That will be true as long as international intervention means American interference. The most likely sources of the next ebola or HIV-like pandemic are the countries that simply won’t let U.S. or other Western agencies in, including the World Health Organization. Yet the threat is too arcane and not immediate enough for the West to force the issue. What’s needed is another great power to take over a piece of the work, a power that has more immediate interests in the countries where diseases incubate and one that is seen as less of a threat. **As long as the United States remains the world’s lone superpower, we’re not likely to get any help.** Even after HIV, SARS, and several years of mounting hysteria about avian flu, the world is still not ready for a viral pandemic in Southeast Asia or sub-Saharan Africa. America can’t change that alone.

#### Zoonotic diseases specifically lead to extinction

Casadevall 12 – Prof @ Department of Microbiology and Immunology and the Division of Infectious Diseases of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine Arturo. (“The future of biological warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology, p. 584-5)

In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats. At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) infectious disease. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes recent decades have provided **unequivocal evidence** for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian species (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that many pathogens required their hosts and that some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and **have no need for a host**, such as the majority of fungal pathogens. For those types of host–microbe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Tayloret al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering.

**Next is our defense-**

**Counterbalancing independently causes resistance to u.s.- counterbalancing and globalization means the US doesn’t influence global outcomes- Globalization means countries don’t rely on the US and the legitimation process imposes constraints and meand the US cant translate capability into power.**

**Six constraints on U.S. action that make heg ineffective- balancing, legitimacy, timing, domestic constraints, sunk costs, and restraint**

**No unique benefits to unipolarity – great powers can still have influence in multipolarity – only a risk they screw it up**

**Monteiro 11** \*Nuno P. Monteiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University [<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064>, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful”]

What, then, is the value of unipolarity for the unipole? What can a unipole do that a great power in bipolarity or multipolarity cannot? My argument hints at the possibility that—at least in the security realm—unipolarity does not give the unipole greater influence over international outcomes.118 If unipolarity provides structural incentives for nuclear proliferation, it may, as Robert Jervis has hinted, “have within it the seeds if not of its own destruction, then at least of its modification.”119 For Jervis, “[t]his raises the question of what would remain of a unipolar system in a proliferated world. The American ability to coerce others would decrease but so would its need to defend friendly powers that would now have their own deterrents. The world would still be unipolar by most measures and considerations, but many countries would be able to protect themselves, perhaps even against the superpower. . . . In any event, the polarity of the system may become less important.”

**No offense-**

**Multipolarity solves war- lack of great power aggressiveness makes war unthinkable, empirical examples fail this system will be different**

**Schweller 10 \*Randall Schweller is a** Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University [“Entropy and the trajectory of world politics: why polarity has become less meaningful,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 23, Number 1, March 2010]

Though rarely mentioned, system equilibrium can emerge without balancing or power-seeking behaviour. This should not come as a surprise; for we know that a Concert system existed during a multipolar phase, roughly between 1815 and 1853. That system, however, arose from the ashes of war, the purpose of which was to defeat an aspiring hegemon before it rolled up the system. The current system, however, has already been ‘rolled up’ for all intents and purposes. So how could a balance of power be restored without deliberate balancing against the US? The answer is that uneven rates of growth among states seeking merely to get rich (wealth, not military power, security, or political influence over others) can produce a rough equivalence in capabilities among several states, none of which feel particularly threatened by each other or seek relative gains at the expense of one another. In other words, the major actors in the system are strictly egoistic, and they interact cooperatively, not competitively or strategically in a military sense, with each other. It is essentially an orthodox liberal world, in which international politics becomes a positive-sum game and the concept of equilibrium is, by definition, a Pareto optimal condition that no actor has an interest in changing (see Callinicos 2007, 546). Here, global equilibrium means maximum entropy. What has changed? Simply put, there is no longer an expectation of violent expansion among the great powers. Balance of power is built on the assumption not only that war is a legitimate instrument of statecraft (Jervis 1986, 60) but that states will settle their differences by fighting. This expectation exercises a profound influence on the types of behaviours exhibited by states and the system as awhole (Lasswell 1965 [1935], chapter 3). It was not just the prospect of war that triggered the basic dynamics of past multipolar and bipolar systems. It was the anticipation that powerful states sought to and would, if given the right odds, carry out territorial conquests at each others’ expense that shaped and shoved actors in ways consistent with the predictions of Waltzian balance of power theory.Without the very real fear of Soviet expansion, why would bipolarity have compelled the US to adopt a grand strategy of containment and deterrence? Without the traditional expectations of great power war and conquest, why would the added complexity and uncertainty of multipolar systems make them unstable? Why would states form alliances in the first place, much less worry about who aligns with whom? When war is unthinkable among the great powers, it is hard to see how polarity exerts the constraints predicted by structural balance of power theory. To the extent that this driving force of history is no longer in play, the system will experience increasing entropy. The current system’s ideational or social structures also seem to be pushing in the direction of greater entropy, suggesting that the world may be reaching an endpoint of sorts. This view of history is consistent with Kant’s (2005 [1795]) ‘perpetual peace’, Richard Rosecrance’s (1987) ‘rise of the trading state’, Francis Fukuyama’s (1992) ‘end of history’ and, for slightly different reasons, John Ikenberry’s (2001) vision of a ‘constitutional order’ rooted in liberalism. Regarding the latter, a ‘multipolar’ constitutional order would not be all that different from the current world because: (1) constitutional orders place limits on the returns to power, so presumably a switch from unipolarity to multipolarity would not be terribly significant; (2) the system, though multipolar, would retain the basic foundations of the American liberal order, its underlying social values would remain intact, and (3) there would be, just as today, no balancing behaviour among the major powers against each other, and major power war would be virtually unthinkable. That noted, Ikenberry’s view of order is more centralized, structured and deliberate than the one I have in mind. An entropy version of Ikenberry’s order would be a watered-down, more decentralized and spontaneously generated liberal order—but one that still devalues power. Liberals are not the only ones making such claims. Several prominent realists have also acknowledged that the world has fundamentally changed to the point that, if and when unipolarity ends, we will not likely see a return to traditional great power politics among the core states. Robert Jervis (2005), for instance, stresses the unprecedented development of a Security Community among all the leading powers as the defining feature of today’s world politics. The existence of this security community means not only that **major power war has become unthinkable but also that bandwagoning and balancing ‘will not map on the classical form of the balance of power’** (Jervis 2005, 31). Similarly, Jonathan Kirshner (2008, 335) sees fewer prospects for great power war as a consequence of globalization. Along these lines, Fareed Zakaria (2008, 243) predicts a postAmerican world governed by a messy ad hoc order composed of a` la carte multilateralism and networked interactions among state and nonstate actors. The provision of international order in this future world will no longer be a matter decided solely by the political and military power held by a single hegemon or even a group of leading states. The bottomline is that, if war no longer lurks in the background of great power relations and if strong states must share power with institutions and nonstate actors, then to say that the world is becoming multipolar is, if not meaningless, grossly misleading. The dynamics of this new multipolar world will be significantly different from those of past multipolar systems. When great powers built arms in traditional multipolar settings, they did so under the belief that it was not only possible but probable that their weapons would be targeted and used against each other. Likewise, when they formed alliances, they targeted them at one another. A Community composed of the most developed states in the international system was not on the menu of traditional alliance politics under multipolarity. Of course, international politics can change rapidly and the mere prediction that the Community will survive into the foreseeable future, no matter how compelling it appears to us today, does not mean that the Community will not dissolve sooner than later. Even so, it is difficult to see how major power war becomes thinkable again given the intolerably high costs of war and the obvious destructiveness of nuclear weapons, the benefits of peace grounded in the perceived decoupling of territorial conquest from national prosperity, and the shared values and beliefs about how the world works among the leading states (Jervis 2005).

**No inevitable cling to power-**

**2). The 1AC was a reason why heg would collapse now- voting neg is voting for a world without the hegemon, regardless of the inevitable cling.**

**Policymakers won’t hold on to heg**

**Macdonald and Parent 11** \* Paul-**Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami [November/ December 2011, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment”** <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136510/joseph-m-parent-and-paul-k-macdonald/the-wisdom-of-retrenchment>]

Others warn that the U.S. political system is too fragmented to implement a coordinated policy of retrenchment. In this view, even if the foreign policy community unanimously subscribed to this strategy, it would be unable to outmaneuver lobbying groups and bureaucracies that favor a more activist approach. Electoral pressures reward lucrative defense contracts and chest-thumping stump speeches rather than sober appraisals of declining fortunes. Whatever leaders' preferences are, bureaucratic pressures promote conservative decisions, policy inertia, and big budgets -- none of which is likely to usher in an era of self-restraint. Despite deep partisan divides, however, Republicans and Democrats have often put aside their differences when it comes to foreign policy. After World War II, the United States did not revert to the isolationism of earlier periods: both parties backed massive programs to contain the Soviet Union. During the tempestuous 1960s, a consensus emerged in favor of détente with the Soviets. The 9/11 attacks generated bipartisan support for action against al Qaeda and its allies. Then, in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, politicians across the spectrum recognized the need to bring the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to an end. When faced with pressing foreign policy challenges, U.S. politicians generally transcend ideological divides and forge common policies, sometimes expanding the United States' global commitments and sometimes contracting them. Today, electoral pressures support a more modest approach to foreign affairs. According to a 2009 study by the Pew Research Center, 70 percent of Americans would rather the United States share global leadership than go it alone. And a 2010 study by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 79 percent of them thought the United States played the role of world policeman more than it should. Even on sacrosanct issues such as the defense budget, the public has demonstrated a willingness to consider reductions. In a 2010 study conducted by the Program for Public Consultation at the University of Maryland, 64 percent of respondents endorsed reductions in defense spending, supporting an average cut of $109 billion to the base-line defense budget. Institutional barriers to reform do remain. Yet when presidents have led, the bureaucrats have largely followed. Three successive administrations, beginning with that of Ronald Reagan, were able to tame congressional opposition and push through an ambitious realignment program that ultimately resulted in the closure of 100 military bases, saving $57 billion. In its 2010 defense budget, the Obama administration succeeded in canceling plans to acquire additional F-22 Raptors despite fierce resistance by lobbyists, members of Congress, and the air force brass. The 2010 budget also included cuts to the navy's fleet of stealth destroyers and various components of the army's next generation of manned ground vehicles. Thus, claims that retrenchment is politically impractical or improbable are unfounded. Just as a more humble foreign policy will invite neither instability nor decline, domestic political factors will not inevitably prevent timely reform. To chart a new course, U.S. policymakers need only possess foresight and will.

### NOTE

#### I don’t have the 2NC on the rest of the case debate…it was just some impact defense stuff and inherency / TBA will pass now I think.

#### Callahan

## 1NR

### impact

#### Visas are key to cybersecurity preparedness

McLarty 9 (Thomas F. III, President – McLarty Associates and Former White House Chief of Staff and Task Force Co-Chair, “U.S. Immigration Policy: Report of a CFR-Sponsored Independent Task Force”, 7-8, http://www.cfr.org/ publication/19759/us\_immigration\_policy.html)

We have seen, when you look at the table of the top 20 firms that are H1-B visa requestors, at least 15 of those are IT firms. And as we're seeing across industry, much of the hardware and software that's used in this country is not only manufactured now overseas, but it's developed overseas by scientists and engineers who were educated here in the United States.¶ We're seeing a lot more activity around cyber-security, certainly noteworthy attacks here very recently. It's becoming an increasingly dominant set of requirements across not only to the Department of Defense, but the Department of Homeland Security and the critical infrastructure that's held in private hands. Was there any discussion or any interest from DOD or DHS as you undertook this review on the security things about what can be done to try to generate a more effective group of IT experts here in the United States, many of which are coming to the U.S. institutions, academic institutions from overseas and often returning back? This potentially puts us at a competitive disadvantage going forward.¶ MCLARTY: Yes. And I think your question largely is the answer as well. I mean, clearly we have less talented students here studying -- or put another way, more talented students studying in other countries that are gifted, talented, really have a tremendous ability to develop these kind of technology and scientific advances, we're going to be put at an increasingly disadvantage. Where if they come here -- and I kind of like Dr. Land's approach of the green card being handed to them or carefully put in their billfold or purse as they graduate -- then, obviously, that's going to strengthen, I think, our system, our security needs.

#### Cyber-vulnerability causes great power nuclear war

Fritz 9 Researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament [Jason, researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, former Army officer and consultant, and has a master of international relations at Bond University, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control,” July, <http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf>]

This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons. Specifically, this research will use open source knowledge to identify the structure of nuclear command and control centres, how those structures might be compromised through computer network operations, and how doing so would fit within established cyber terrorists’ capabilities, strategies, and tactics. If access to command and control centres is obtained, terrorists could fake or actually cause one nuclear-armed state to attack another, thus provoking a nuclear response from another nuclear power. This may be an easier alternative for terrorist groups than building or acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb themselves. This would also act as a force equaliser, and provide terrorists with the asymmetric benefits of high speed, removal of geographical distance, and a relatively low cost. Continuing difficulties in developing computer tracking technologies which could trace the identity of intruders, and difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed upon legal framework to guide responses to computer network operations, point towards an inherent weakness in using computer networks to manage nuclear weaponry. This is particularly relevant to reducing the hair trigger posture of existing nuclear arsenals. All computers which are connected to the internet are susceptible to infiltration and remote control. Computers which operate on a closed network may also be compromised by various hacker methods, such as privilege escalation, roaming notebooks, wireless access points, embedded exploits in software and hardware, and maintenance entry points. For example, e-mail spoofing targeted at individuals who have access to a closed network, could lead to the installation of a virus on an open network. This virus could then be carelessly transported on removable data storage between the open and closed network. Information found on the internet may also reveal how to access these closed networks directly. Efforts by militaries to place increasing reliance on computer networks, including experimental technology such as autonomous systems, and their desire to have multiple launch options, such as nuclear triad capability, enables multiple entry points for terrorists. For example, if a terrestrial command centre is impenetrable, perhaps isolating one nuclear armed submarine would prove an easier task. There is evidence to suggest multiple attempts have been made by hackers to compromise the extremely low radio frequency once used by the US Navy to send nuclear launch approval to submerged submarines. Additionally, the alleged Soviet system known as Perimetr was designed to automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was unable to establish communications with Soviet leadership. This was intended as a retaliatory response in the event that nuclear weapons had decapitated Soviet leadership; however it did not account for the possibility of cyber terrorists blocking communications through computer network operations in an attempt to engage the system. Should a warhead be launched, damage could be further enhanced through additional computer network operations. By using proxies, multi-layered attacks could be engineered. Terrorists could remotely commandeer computers in China and use them to launch a US nuclear attack against Russia. Thus Russia would believe it was under attack from the US and the US would believe China was responsible. Further, emergency response communications could be disrupted, transportation could be shut down, and disinformation, such as misdirection, could be planted, thereby hindering the disaster relief effort and maximizing destruction. Disruptions in communication and the use of disinformation could also be used to provoke uninformed responses. For example, a nuclear strike between India and Pakistan could be coordinated with Distributed Denial of Service attacks against key networks, so they would have further difficulty in identifying what happened and be forced to respond quickly. Terrorists could also knock out communications between these states so they cannot discuss the situation. Alternatively, amidst the confusion of a traditional large-scale terrorist attack, claims of responsibility and declarations of war could be falsified in an attempt to instigate a hasty military response. These false claims could be posted directly on Presidential, military, and government websites. E-mails could also be sent to the media and foreign governments using the IP addresses and e-mail accounts of government officials. A sophisticated and all encompassing combination of traditional terrorism and cyber terrorism could be enough to launch nuclear weapons on its own, without the need for compromising command and control centres directly.

#### Cyber-attack is coming ---actors are probing weaknesses

Reed 12 John, Reports on the frontiers of cyber war and the latest in military technology for Killer Apps at Foreign Policy, "U.S. energy companies victims of potentially destructive cyber intrusions", 10/11, killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/11/us\_energy\_companies\_victims\_of\_potentially\_destructive\_cyber\_attacks

Foreign actors are probing the networks of key American companies in an attempt to gain control of industrial facilities and transportation systems, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta revealed tonight.¶ "We know that foreign **cyber actors are probing America's critical infrastructure networks**," said Panetta, disclosing previously classified information during a speech in New York laying out the Pentagon's role in protecting the U.S. from cyber attacks. "They are targeting the computer control systems that operate chemical, **electricity** and water plants, and those that guide transportation thorough the country."¶ He went on to say that the U.S. government knows of "specific instances where intruders have gained access" to these systems -- frequently known as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (or SCADA) systems -- and that "they are seeking to create advanced tools to attack these systems and cause panic, destruction and even the loss of life," according to an advance copy of his prepared remarks.¶ The secretary said that **a coordinated attack on enough critical infrastructure could be a "cyber Pearl Harbor" that would "cause physical destruction and loss of life, paralyze and shock the nation, and create a profound new sense of vulnerability.**"¶ While there have been reports of criminals using 'spear phishing' email attacks aimed at stealing information about American utilties, Panetta's remarks seemed to suggest more sophisticated, nation-state backed attempts to actually gain control of and damage power-generating equipment. ¶ Panetta's comments regarding the penetration of American utilities echo those of a private sector cyber security expert Killer Apps spoke with last week **who said that the networks of American electric companies were penetrated, perhaps in preparation for a Stuxnet-style attack**.¶ Stuxnet is the famous cyber weapon that infected Iran's uranium-enrichment centrifuges in 2009 and 2010. Stuxnet is believed to have caused some of the machines to spin erratically, thereby destroying them.¶ "**There is hard evidence** that there has been penetration of our power companies, and given Stuxnet, that is a staging step before destruction" of electricity-generating equipment, the expert told Killer Apps. Because uranium centrifuges and power turbines are both spinning machines, "**the attack is identical -- the one to take out the centrifuges and the one to take out our power systems is the same attack**."¶ "If a centrifuge running at the wrong speed can blow apart" so can a power generator, said the expert. "If you do, in fact, spin them at the wrong speeds, you can blow up any rotating device."¶ Cyber security expert Eugene Kaspersky said two weeks ago that one of his greatest fears is someone reverse-engineering a sophisticated cyber weapon like Stuxnet **-- a relatively easy task** -- and he noted that Stuxnet itself passed through power plants on its way to Iran. "Stuxnet infected thousands of computer systems all around the globe, I know there were power plants infected by Stuxnet very far away from Iran," Kaspersky said.

### 2NC Will Pass

#### Immigration will pass—House republicans are signing onto the House Democrat’s bill which proves that momentum is toward passage—their evidence just cites obstacles—prefer evidence that assumes broader momentum and the ability of the House to overcome those obstacles—that’s 1NC Sargent

#### Will pass – GOP

FN 10-30 [Fox News. “Pressure on House to vote on immigration renews focus on enforcement, 'sanctuary' laws” *Fox News*, 10/30/13 <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/10/30/pressure-on-house-to-vote-on-immigration-renews-focus-on-enforcement-sanctuary/> //GBS-JV]

House Speaker John Boehner has expressed interest in allowing votes on several incremental immigration bills, which would likely include one on tighter border security.¶ However, those concerned about the enforcement of immigration laws also fear House leaders will take their legislation to a conference committee with Senate Democrats and leave with a comprehensive bill that is tantamount to amnesty for many of this country’s 11 million illegal immigrants.¶ “If the leadership appoints conferees and we go to conference committee with the Senate over the Schumer-Rubio amnesty bill, the odds are pretty good they're going to come out with something that is basically the same as Schumer's bill,” Mark Krikorian, executive director of the Center for Immigration Studies, said recently.¶ That situation might put enough pressure on Boehner to put that bill to a full floor vote, which would likely pass with support from House Democrats and moderate Republicans, critics argue.

#### It’ll pass but political incentives make it close and mean PC is key

Sullivan 10-28 [Sean. Politics for Washington Post. “Why Obama is racing the clock on immigration” *The Washington Post*, 10/28/13 ln//GBS-JV]

President Barack Obama used a very urgent tone Thursday in remarks designed to press House Republicans to pass immigration reform, calling on them at least twice to try to get it done “this year.”¶ ¶ “Let’s not wait,” the president said. “It doesn’t get easier to just put it off. Let’s do it now.”¶ Politically speaking, the president is right. The longer the immigration debate drags on, the lower the odds it will culminate in a bill on his desk.¶ ¶ Here’s why.¶ ¶ Every day that goes by is a day closer to the 2014 midterm elections. And the months leading up to Election Day are a time for lawmakers to campaign, raise money, and do everything they can to hold on to their jobs. It’s not a time for a contentious legislative debate that could complicate the fall campaign.¶ ¶ That’s why history has shown that little gets done legislatively right before the election. Members are in their districts and states more and more often and less and less willing to take risks in Congress.¶ ¶ And immigration reform is a risky proposition for many House Republicans. Despite national polls showing the public largely in favor of overhauling the nation’s laws, the calculus is often different back home. This is in large part why months after the Senate passed a sweeping bipartisan immigration bill, the House has yet to act.¶ ¶ **But that doesn’t mean it won’t.** Republicans have already moved ahead on some piecemeal measures. And House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, said Wednesday that he was “hopeful” something could get done by the end of the year.¶ ¶ Coming off a fiscal battle that badly damaged the Republican brand, there is, arguably, more political incentive for Boehner to act on immigration than there has been in the past. Republicans need to repair their image.¶ ¶ But there isn’t much time left on the legislative calendar this year, and it’s not clear whether Boehner will bring immigration to a vote before the year is up. But this much we do know: Every day that goes by makes it increasingly difficult to pass new immigration laws.

#### Rubio also proves momentum

Kim 10/28 – Seung Min Kim is an assistant editor who covers Congress for POLITICO. Previously, she edited the Arena and served as a Web producer. (“Marco Rubio sparks immigration debate”, 10/28/2013, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/marco-rubio-sparks-immigration-debate-98992.html)

Marco Rubio’s latest comments supporting scaled-back immigration reform may not be the death knell for the effort that they seem. Immigration reformers argue that the remarks don’t actually change the political calculus in the GOP-led House, which was never going to pass the Senate’s comprehensive bill anyway. Reform foes say Rubio lost any credibility he had with House conservatives by authoring the Gang of Eight bill in the first place. The Florida senator has long called for giving House Republicans some space to come up with their own plan. And some advocates believe Rubio’s call to focus on piecemeal aspects of reform could actually pave the way for some kind of agreement between the House and Senate. “This is making a more doable ask for House Republicans. House Republicans are trying to pass pieces that add up to a package,” said Tamar Jacoby, the president and CEO of ImmigrationWorks USA, a pro-reform business group. “‘We’ll meet you halfway’ is essentially what the message is.” She added of Rubio’s remarks: “That’s just realism.” But Rubio became the target of criticism on Monday from some outside reform advocates and opponents as they alternatively groused that he is either ditching the Senate Gang of Eight bill he once so fiercely supported or still trying to repair his image with conservative voters who don’t want to legalize the millions of undocumented immigrants in the country to begin with. Rubio’s comments come amid a small and very narrow window for action on immigration reform before the end of the year. House Republican leaders have no current plans to vote on any type of reform legislation — but that could change if momentum grows for action in the House. Since the Senate bill’s passage in June, Rubio has stayed away from efforts to publicly pressure House Republicans on immigration reform. He has repeatedly opted not to meet with the other seven Gang senators to devise a strategy on how to move reform through the House, and his comments are the next chapter in Rubio’s hands-off effort in the House. Randy Johnson, a senior vice president at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, said during a conference call Monday that he believed at least one or two immigration bills, “if not more,” will come to the House floor in the weeks ahead. He added that he viewed Rubio’s comments as a way to allow House Republicans to find their own way on immigration reform. “It certainly wasn’t saying, ‘Let’s pull the plug on what’s going on in the House’ or that the House should pull the plug,” said Johnson, who oversees the Chamber’s immigration reform efforts.

#### Lobby push puts it on the fence

Kim 10/29 – Seung Min Kim is an assistant editor who covers Congress for POLITICO. Previously, she edited the Arena and served as a Web producer. (“Conservative groups press for immigration reform”, 10/29/13, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/conservative-groups-immigration-reform-99038.html)

More than 600 conservative-friendly officials and activists are descending on Capitol Hill Tuesday for a lobbying blitz targeting a wide range of House lawmakers, primarily Republicans, on immigration reform. The effort spans lawmakers from about 120 congressional districts in about 40 states, said Josh Breisblatt, the advocacy and policy associate for the National Immigration Forum. It’s meant to make the conservative case for immigration reform to lawmakers by bringing business experts, religious leaders and law enforcement officials to the Hill. Though some House Democrats are included in the so-called “fly-in,” the overwhelming majority are House Republicans — who have been more resistant to an immigration overhaul than their Democratic counterparts. Breisblatt said those participating in the “fly-in” have also scheduled in-person meetings with key House Republican leaders and panel chairs on immigration, including House Majority Whip Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.), House Republican Conference Chairwoman Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-Wash.), House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.), and Rep. Trey Gowdy (R-S.C.), who leads the House subcommittee on immigration. “Failure to come up now with a solution to immigration reform is a sign of weakness, not of strength,” said Al Cardenas, the chairman of the American Conservative Union, during a kick-off event Tuesday morning at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Tuesday’s “fly-in” came as a second House Republican backed a Democratic-led comprehensive bill that mostly resembles the sweeping legislation that passed the Senate in June. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida said in a statement that she will support any approach that “will help us move the negotiations forward.” “Other members may soon produce a bipartisan product that may also deserve support,” she said. “I’m cautiously optimistic that we can pass meaningful immigration reform.”

#### More ev—momentum

Horowitz 10/29 – Rob Horowitz is a strategic and communications consultant who provides general consulting, public relations, direct mail services and polling for national and state issue organizations, various non-profits and elected officials and candidates. He is an Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Rhode Island. (“Rob Horowitz: Comprehensive Immigration Reform Is Back”, 10/29/2013, http://www.golocalprov.com/politics/rob-horowitz-comprehensive-immigration-reform-is-back/)

This week begins a renewed push for comprehensive immigration reform—currently stalled out in the House, despite passing the US Senate by more than 2-to-1 with broad bi-partisan support at the beginning of the summer. At a White House event last week designed to bring new momentum to the comprehensive immigration reform fight, President Obama told an audience of business, union, and religious leaders, “It's good for our economy. It's good for our national security. It's good for our people. And we should do it this year.” Putting the American Dream within reach Far more important for bettering the prospects of House passage, 600 mainly conservative leaders from the religious, business, and farm sectors will be strongly advocating comprehensive immigration reform to targeted Republican House members this week, as reported by The New York Times over the weekend. They are concentrating on 80 representatives from 40 different states, according to The Times. The US Chamber of Commerce, perhaps the most powerful lobby in Washington, is playing a central role in organizing this effort and devoting substantial resources to adopting comprehensive immigration reform. President Obama and the US Chamber of Commerce both advocate that the House simply pass the legislation that has already cleared the Senate. This legislation, sponsored by 8 Senators evenly divided between Democrats and Republicans, aims to fix our broken immigration system by paving the way for the 11 million or so undocumented immigrants already here to emerge from the shadows and fully participate in American life, opening up our doors more widely through expanded legal immigration targeted to attract the world’s best and brightest, and stepping up enforcement to prevent future illegal immigration. More specifically, it creates a tough, but achievable path to citizenship. It offers sensible interim steps, permitting undocumented immigrants already here in the nation to immediately emerge from the shadows. It also expands the number of visas available for highly skilled workers while providing them with a smoother path to permanent residency, steps up enforcement, and puts substantially increased resources into border security. Cautiously optimistic Of course, there is no real chance of the House passing the Senate bill in its current form, and comprehensive immigration reform advocates recognize this political reality. Still, they hope to maintain the key components. Speaker Boehner (R-OH) continues to signal support for the general principle of comprehensive reform, but also continues to say that the House will take a more incremental approach. Boehner recently said, “I still think that immigration reform is an important subject that needs to be addressed.” The Speaker remarked that he was ‘hopeful’ when asked whether he would bring immigration reform legislation up for a vote before the end of the year. There is still strong entrenched hard line right wing opposition in the House to immigration reform. But the fallout from the recent shutdown fight has made business leaders and organizations who were dismayed at the apparent willingness of the Tea Party wing of the House Republicans to risk economic havoc, more determined than ever to stand up and fight on issues like immigration reform, which they strongly believe will be a big economic boost and good for the nation as a whole. This new commitment to stand up and fight by more establishment Republicans bodes well for the chances of adopting comprehensive immigration reform.

### Link debate

#### The plan’s unpopular—uncertainty over implementation and lack of communication means Obama unilaterally ramming it through the committe is unpopular

#### Uncertainty over the dispute resolution mechanism causes Congressional fights

Brown & Meacham 12 – Neil Brown and Carl Meacham, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senior Staff Members, 12/21/12, “Oil, Mexico, and the Transboundary Agreement,” http://www.foreign.senate.gov/publications/download/oil-mexico-and-the-transboundary-agreement

The TBA contains numerous provisions in anticipation of disputes on allocation of resources under a unitization agreement and implementation of those agreements. Legal analysis of these provisions is beyond the scope of this report. However, it is apparent that lack of clarity on the legal status of the dispute resolution mechanisms should be of concern to the U.S. Congress. The Obama administration contends that the agreement’s arbitration mechanism is not intended to produce binding decisions, however, that is not specifically provided for in the text of the agreement and would be different from arbitration mechanisms in many other international agreements.

#### Their first piece of evidence is really really bad—it just says some lawmkers like the bill—this proves our link claim as it proves that there are people who are willing to go to bat for the TBA but our link arguments also prove there are people who will vote those other people

#### The chamber of commerce link turn is also pretty terrible—just says they link the plan and that they are a big business federation—the argument I just made about people willing to go to bad for THA also apply here

### 1NR—a/t: Dickinson

#### Default to issue-specific uniqueness—even if PC generally doesn’t outweigh, it’s specifically key on the margins of immigration to get the House GOP on board which proves we’re the exception to the rule

#### PC is real, finite, and works, especially at the margins

Matthew N. Beckmann and Vimal Kumar 11, Profs Department of Political Science, @ University of California Irvine "How Presidents Push, When Presidents Win" Journal of Theoretical Politics 2011 23: 3 SAGE

Before developing presidents’ lobbying options for building winning coalitions on Capitol Hill, it is instructive to consider **cases where the president has no** political capital and no viable lobbying options. In such circumstances of **imposed passivity** (beyond offering a proposal), **a president’s fate is clear**: his proposals are subject to pivotal voters’ preferences. So if a president lacking political capital proposes to change some far-off status quo, that is, one on the opposite side of the median or otherwise pivotal voter, a (Condorcet) winner always exists, and it coincides with the pivot’s predisposition (Brady and Volden, 1998; Krehbiel, 1998) (see also Black (1948) and Downs (1957)). Considering that there tends to be substantial ideological distance between presidents and pivotal voters, positive presidential inﬂuence without lobbying, then, is not much inﬂuence at all.¶ As with all lobbyists, presidents looking to push legislation must do so indirectly by **push**ing the **lawmakers whom they need to pass it**. Or, as Richard Nesustadt artfully explained:¶ The essence of a President’s persuasive task, with congressmen and everybody else, is to induce them to believe that what he wants of them is what their own appraisal of their own responsibilities requires them to do in their interest, not his…Persuasion deals in the coin of self-interest with men who have some freedom to reject what they ﬁnd counterfeit. (Neustadt, 1990: 40) ¶ Fortunately for contemporary presidents, today’s White House affords its occupants an unrivaled supply of **persuasive carrots and sticks**. Beyond the ofﬁce’s unique visibility and prestige, among both citizens and their representatives in Congress, presidents may also sway lawmakers by using their discretion in budgeting and/or rulemaking, unique fundraising and campaigning capacity, control over executive and judicial nominations, veto power, or numerous other options under the chief executive’s control. Plainly, when it comes to the arm-twisting, brow-beating, and horse-trading that so often characterizes legislative battles, modern presidents are uniquely well equipped for the ﬁght. In the following we employ the omnibus concept of ‘presidential political capital’ to capture this conception of presidents’ positive power as persuasive bargaining.¶ Speciﬁ- cally, we deﬁne presidents’ political capital as the **class of tactics White House ofﬁcials employ to induce changes in lawmakers’ behavior.**¶Importantly, this conception of presidents’ positive power as persuasive bargaining not only **meshes with previous scholarship** on lobbying (see, e.g., Austen-Smith and Wright (1994), Groseclose and Snyder (1996), Krehbiel (1998: ch. 7), and Snyder (1991)), but also **presidential practice.** For example, Goodwin recounts how President Lyndon Johnson routinely allocated ‘rewards’ to ‘cooperative’ members:¶ The rewards themselves (and the withholding of rewards) . . . might be something as unobtrusive as receiving an invitation to join the President in a walk around the White House grounds, knowing that pictures of the event would be sent to hometown newspapers . . . [or something as pointed as] public works projects, military bases, educational research grants, poverty projects, appointments of local men to national commissions, the granting of pardons, and more. (Goodwin, 1991: 237) Of course, presidential political capital is a scarce commodity with a ﬂoating value. Even a favorabl[e]y situated president enjoys only a ﬁnite supply of political **capital**; **he can only promise or pressure so much**. What is more, this capital **ebbs and ﬂows as realities and/or perceptions change**. So, similarly to Edwards (1989), we believe presidents’ bargaining resources cannot fundamentally alter legislators’ predispositions, but rather operate ‘at the margins’ of US lawmaking, **however important those margins may be** (see also Bond and Fleisher (1990), Peterson (1990), Kingdon (1989), Jones (1994), and Rudalevige (2002)). Indeed, our aim is to explicate those margins and show how **presidents may** systematically inﬂuence them.

#### Prefer our evidence—theirs is a blog post where Dickinson can write whatever he wants without peer review or editing—ours actually has empirical basis and is from a peer-reviewed journal—that should be the gold standard for these kinds of PC theory debates because it’s the only way to understand broader empirical data and the way that the academic literature votes

#### Even if the media exaggerates its effectiveness, PC still causes vote shifting

Beckman 10 Matthew N. Beckman, Professor of Political Science @ UC-Irvine, 2010, “Pushing the Agenda: Presidential Leadership in U.S. Lawmaking, 1953-2004,” pg. 17

**Even though** Washington correspondents surely overestimate a sitting president's potential sway in Congress, **more than a kernel of truth remains**. Modern presidents do enjoy tremendous persuasive assets: unmatched public visibility; unequaled professional staff, unrivaled historical prestige, unparalleled fundraising capacity. And buttressing these persuasive power sources are others, including a president’s considerable discretion over federal appointments, bureaucratic rules, legislative vetoes, and presidential trinkets.9 **So even with their limitations duly noted**, presidents clearly still enjoy an impressive bounty in the grist of political persuasion - one they can (and do) draw on to help **build winning coalitions on Capitol Hill.**

#### Prefer our reading of the Beckmann and Kumar evidence—theirs just says Congressional dynamics are uncertain but ours goes the next step and says PC still matters in close cases

### a/t: winners win

#### The plan isn’t a win—our links prove it has no supporters and their evidence assumes a cooperative effort, not Obama unilaterally ramming the plan through Congress

#### Wins don’t spillover---capital is finite---prioritizing issues is key

Schultz 13 David Schultz is a professor at Hamline University School of Business, where he teaches classes on privatization and public, private and nonprofit partnerships. He is the editor of the Journal of Public Affairs Education (JPAE). “Obama's dwindling prospects in a second term,” MinnPost, 1/22, http://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2013/01/obamas-dwindling-prospects-second-term

Four more years for Obama. Now what? What does Barack Obama do in his second term and what can he accomplish? Simply put, his options are limited and the prospects for major success quite limited. Presidential power is the power to persuade, as Richard Neustadt famously stated. Many factors determine presidential power and the ability to influence including personality (as James David Barber argued), attitude toward power, margin of victory, public support, support in Congress, and one’s sense of narrative or purpose. Additionally, presidential power is temporal, often greatest when one is first elected, and it is contextual, affected by competing items on an agenda. All of these factors affect the political power or capital of a president. Presidential power also is a finite and generally decreasing product. The first hundred days in office – so marked forever by FDR’s first 100 in 1933 – are usually a honeymoon period, during which presidents often get what they want. FDR gets the first New Deal, Ronald Reagan gets Kemp-Roth, George Bush in 2001 gets his tax cuts. Presidents lose political capital, support But, over time, presidents lose political capital. Presidents get distracted by world and domestic events, they lose support in Congress or among the American public, or they turn into lame ducks. This is the problem Obama now faces. Obama had a lot of political capital when sworn in as president in 2009. He won a decisive victory for change with strong approval ratings and had majorities in Congress — with eventually a filibuster margin in the Senate, when Al Franken finally took office in July. Obama used his political capital to secure a stimulus bill and then pass the Affordable Care Act. He eventually got rid of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and secured many other victories. But Obama was a lousy salesman, and he lost what little control of Congress that he had in the 2010 elections.

#### Best political science proves

Jackie Calmes, NYTimes, 11/12/12, In Debt Talks, Obama Is Ready to Go Beyond Beltway, mobile.nytimes.com/2012/11/12/us/politics/legacy-at-stake-obama-plans-broader-push-for-budget-deal.xml

That story line, stoked by Republicans but shared by some Democrats, holds that Mr. Obama is too passive and deferential to Congress, a legislative naïf who does little to nurture personal relationships with potential allies in short, not a particularly strong leader. Even as voters re-elected Mr. Obama, those who said in surveys afterward that strong leadership was the most important quality for a president overwhelmingly chose Mr. Romney.¶ George C. Edwards III, a leading scholar of the presidency at Texas A & M University who is currently teaching at Oxford University, dismissed such criticisms as shallow and generally wrong. Yet Mr. Edwards, whose book on Mr. Obama's presidency is titled "Overreach," said, "He didn't understand the limits of what he could do."¶ "They thought they could continuously create opportunities and they would succeed, and then there would be more success and more success, and we'd build this advancing-tide theory of legislation," Mr. Edwards said. "And that was very naïve, very silly. Well, they've learned a lot, I think."¶ "Effective leaders," he added, "exploit opportunities rather than create them."¶ The budget showdown is an opportunity. But like many, it holds risks as well as potential rewards.¶ "This election is the second chance to be what he promised in 2008, and that is to break the gridlock in Washington," said Kenneth M. Duberstein, a Reagan White House chief of staff, who voted for Mr. Obama in 2008 and later expressed disappointment. "But it seems like this is a replay of 2009 and 2010, when he had huge majorities in the House and Senate, rather than recognizing that 'we've got to figure out ways to work together and it's not just what I want.' "¶ For now, at least, Republican lawmakers say they may be open to raising the tax bill for some earners. "We can increase revenue without increasing the tax rates on anybody in this country," said Representative Tom Price, Republican of Georgia and a leader of House conservatives, on "Fox News Sunday." "We can lower the rates, broaden the base, close the loopholes."¶ The challenge for Mr. Obama is to use his postelection leverage to persuade Republicans or to help Speaker John A. Boehner persuade Republicans that a tax compromise is in their party's political interest since most Americans favor compromise and higher taxes on the wealthy to reduce annual deficits.¶ Some of the business leaders the president will meet with on Wednesday are members of the new Fix the Debt coalition, which has raised about $40 million to urge lawmakers and their constituents to support a plan that combines spending cuts with new revenue. That session will follow Mr. Obama's meeting with labor leaders on Tuesday.¶ His first trip outside Washington to engage the public will come after Thanksgiving, since Mr. Obama is scheduled to leave next weekend on a diplomatic trip to Asia. Travel plans are still sketchy, partly because his December calendar is full of the traditional holiday parties.¶ Democrats said the White House's strategy of focusing both inside and outside of Washington was smart. "You want to avoid getting sucked into the Beltway inside-baseball games," said Joel Johnson, a former adviser in the Clinton White House and the Senate. "You can still work toward solutions, but make sure you get out of Washington while you are doing that."¶ The president must use his leverage soon, some Democrats added, because it could quickly wane as Republicans look to the 2014 midterm elections, when the opposition typically takes seats from the president's party in Congress.

#### Winners lose specifically for Obama’s second term

Walsh 12 Ken covers the White House and politics for U.S. News. “Setting Clear Priorities Will Be Key for Obama,” 12/20, http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/Ken-Walshs-Washington/2012/12/20/setting-clear-priorities-will-be-key-for-obama

And there is an axiom in Washington: Congress, the bureaucracy, the media, and other power centers can do justice to only one or two issues at a time. Phil Schiliro, Obama's former liaison to Congress, said Obama has "always had a personal commitment" to gun control, for example.¶ But Schiliro told the New York Times, "Given the crisis he faced when he first took office, there's only so much capacity in the system to move his agenda." So Obama might be wise to limit his goals now and avoid overburdening the system, or he could face major setbacks that would limit his power and credibility for the remainder of his presidency.

#### Obama thinks that pol cap is finite – he’ll back off controversial issues even if he’s winning

**Kuttner 9** (Robert – , co-editor of The American Prospect and a senior fellow at Demos, author of "Obama's Challenge: America's Economic Crisis and the Power of a Transformative Presidency, 4/28/9, “Obama Has Amassed Enormous Political Capital, But He Doesn't Know What to Do with It,” [http://www.alternet.org/economy/138641/obama\_has\_amassed\_enormous\_political\_capital,\_but\_he\_doesn%27t\_know\_what\_to\_do\_with\_it/?page=entire](http://www.alternet.org/economy/138641/obama_has_amassed_enormous_political_capital%2C_but_he_doesn%27t_know_what_to_do_with_it/?page=entire))

**We got a small taste of what a more radical break might feel like** when Obama briefly signaled with the release of Bush's torture memos that he might be open to further investigation of the Bush's torture policy, but then **backtracked** and quickly asked the Democratic leadership to shut the idea down. Evidently, Obama's political self wrestled with his constitutional conscience, and won. Civil libertarians felt a huge letdown, but protest was surprisingly muted.

Thus **the most important obstacle for seizing the moment to achieve enduring change:** Barack **Obama's conception of what it means to promote national unity.** Obama repeatedly declared during the campaign that he would govern as a consensus builder. He wasn't lying. However, there are two ways of achieving consensus. **One is to split the difference** with your political enemies and the forces obstructing reform. The other is to use presidential **leadership** to transform the political center and alter the political dynamics. In his first hundred days, **Obama** has done a little of both, but he **defaults to the politics of accommodation.**

### a/t: vote no

#### vote no isn’t true—you should a citizen analyzing government policy which means the plan necessitates political tradeoffs that you don’t have control over—understanding politics from a citizen’s perspective prepares us for participation in democracy and political change that we can enact as well as a nuanced understanding of how the government enacts policy

#### the politics disad is good—it’s critical to neg ground against shady affs and incentivizes current events education which we wouldn’t have time to gain otherwise